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Electoral Abuse in the Late Roman Republic

Howard Troxler

ABSTRACT

Escalating abuse of elections was a hallmark of the collapse of the Republic that
governed at Rome for nearly 500 years before it was swept away and replaced by
emperors and Empire. The causes of the Republic’s fall are well-explored, but electoral
abuse was one of the agencies by which it was brought low – a “how” that helps explain
the “why.” The abuse of regular electoral form, practiced by all parties, inured the
Romans to further and ever-widening abuse. In the end their elections – and the Republic
– lost both meaning and independence. This is a controversial claim that falls within the
modern debate over the significance of the late-Republican turmoil and just how
“democratic” the system was at all.
A review of the primary source accounts shows a pattern of abuse that clearly
accelerated over the final century, until the turning-point of the 60s and 50s B.C., a
morass of elections delayed, canceled, marred by violence, ruined by bribery or
prearranged by bargain. We can categorize these abuses and examine their effect on
societal attitudes and subsequent practice. After 50 B.C. control of the state passed to
Caesar and then the second triumvirs, who used these precedents to do as they pleased. In
v

the end Augustus “restored” the Republic by restoring its old forms – with an unspoken
different meaning. It was no coincidence that Augustus paid showy respect to the
Republican voting assemblies, the voting-places and the annual election rituals.
The escalating abuse of elections inculcated in the Romans the idea that their
constitution and the rule of law had no intrinsic value by themselves, but existed only as
tools in the service of power and desired goals. With the rule of law battered into
submission, the Republic all the more easily succumbed to the rule of men. The fall was
brought about not by external armies or revolution, but by the Romans’ own tacit
agreement that their rules could be bent and broken as needed. For the Romans, at least,
the argument that “the ends justify the means” proved to be the antithesis and the undoing
of constitutional government.
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Part One: Introduction

Electoral Abuse as Effect and Cause

The Republic that governed at Rome for nearly 500 years with annually elected
magistrates was wracked in its dying years by an unprecedented degree of electoral
abuse. The yearly ritual of choosing the state’s leaders became a crass spectacle of delay,
of manipulation, of mass bribery, of corrupt deal-making and of violence. To be sure,
there had always been electoral irregularities. But as the Republic moved toward collapse
in the mid-first century B.C., these abuses occurred more regularly in thickets and
multitudes. Abusive tactics were employed eagerly by all sides and parties, with each
group justifying its practice by the offenses of the other. The Romans recognized the
damage they were causing and railed at each other for it, but they were unable or
unwilling to stop. Each episode served to justify the next. In the end, the forms and
purposes of the ancient constitution no longer mattered. Once the state fell under the
personal control of the despots, Caesar and the Second Triumvirate, they had ample
precedent to do with the elections as they pleased. When Augustus emerged as the
ultimate victor, the key to his consolidation of power was his “restoration” of Republican
forms, and the elections in particular. So it was the abuse of elections that helped put the
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Republic in its sickbed, and it was the Augustan pretense of “restoring” them that helped
supply the Republic’s death-blow.
This certainly is not a claim that electoral abuse “caused” the failure of the Roman
Republic. Centuries of learned scholars have spent lifetimes on that question. The usual
suspects for driving the Republic to collapse include the breakdown of social consensus,
renewed class struggle, land-hunger by the masses, plebeian armies loyal to ambitious
warlords, the problems of Italian citizenship, weak and reactionary senate leadership, and
the wanton willfulness of the tribunes – to name a few.1 Yet the nexus at which the
interests of all these rival groups came together was the annual elections, the core of the
Roman political identity, the heartbeat of the res publica. Their machinations to delay,
pre-ordain, purchase or bully those elections became one of the agencies by which the
state was driven off the cliff – one of the “hows’’ of the story. In so doing, they also
made electoral abuse one of the “whys,” as it became a causal factor in its own right.
Electoral abuse inured the Romans to their weakened constitution, made alternatives
more conceivable, emboldened and enabled the despots, and gave Augustus and his
supporters a ready platform. Thus escalating attacks on electoral form were both an
effect, and one of the many causes, of the Republic’s march toward chaos.
1 To name a few examples from authors quoted in this paper: For the rise of the knights, generals and
Italians, L.R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949),
17; for the Senate’s inaction creating a “crisis of credibility” in the constitution, J. Von Ungern-Sternberg,
“The Crisis of the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic, ed. H. Flower.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 96; for personal hatred as opposed to structural causes for
the civil war, A.K. Goldsworthy, Caesar: Life of a Colossus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006),
379. A good shopping-list of causes is found in P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related
Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), for instance, mismanaged provinces and the Italian problem, 69;
conflict between senatorial class and equites, 72; failure to control the army, 77; weakness of the senate,
79-81.
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This contention that electoral abuse “mattered” is not at all a dry and dusty fact – it is
controversial. Two trends in the modern debate surrounding this issue are relevant. The
first is whether the late Republican political convulsions truly contributed to a “fall” of
the state at all. Some, notably E.S. Gruen, argue that the Republic remained reasonably
stable until the end, and that the first-century political turmoil was well within the bounds
of flexible Republican practice. In Gruen’s view it took the brute force of civil war and
the armies of Caesar and Cn. Pompeius Magnus to topple an otherwise sturdy
government. A second line of the modern debate, led by F. Millar and others, challenges
the older orthodoxy that the Roman state was not really “democratic,” but rather that the
voting assemblies and the plebs urbana were pawns in a controlling patron-client system.
This debate, too, bears heavily on the significance of electoral abuse. If the whole
electoral mechanism was a sham and everybody knew it, then election abuse meant
considerably less than if meaningful constitutional institutions were under attack.
After a look at these modern debates, we need to set some ground rules for defining
“abuse,” because “abuse” is a charged and subjective term. The question is not whether
the Republicans abused their elections by our standards, but whether they abused them by
their standards. To say that the Roman Republican electoral system was more “flexible”
than our own is an understatement – imagine a U.S. president declaring on the morning
of Election Day that he has suddenly decided to postpone the affair indefinitely! So we
need to know what was “normal” and what was not, and how to gauge when the normal
practice crossed into abuse. Then we can survey the general categories of electoral abuse
in our source accounts and see how they escalated. Such categories include (1) elections
3

delayed or canceled, (2) violations of the laws concerning ages and terms of candidates,
(3) cynical manipulation of the state religion, (4) the effect of violence and gangs, (5)
bribery and electioneering, (6) electoral cabals and prearranged results, (7) usurpation of
constitutional roles, and (8) violations of process as well as other miscellaneous abuses.
We will see how all of this reached a boiling-point in the climactic years 70-50 B.C., how
the Romans recognized their abuses, accepted them and then cited them to justify further
violations, and how the despots trampled the remainders of the constitution and
determined the elections and magistracies by their whim. Lastly, we will see how
Augustus cannily “restored” the forms of Republican elections and glorified them as part
of the pretext by which he gained supreme power. Whether the old Republic had fallen or
been pushed, it was surely broken, and the career talent of Augustus was to get to
everyone to agree (or to pretend) that he had fixed it.

The Modern Debate

In 1974, E.S. Gruen published his Last Generation of the Roman Republic. A major
theme of the book is summed up in his conclusion: “Civil war caused the death of the
Republic – and not vice-versa.”2 Gruen saw the political events of the Republic’s final
decades within a context of overall stability, despite the occasional ruckus coming from
the streets. He surveys the consuls elected during the 70s and 60s B.C. and finds
considerable continuity from the Sullan era; the Pompeians do not manage to wrest away

E.S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974),
504.

2
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control of the state nor to repeal (not yet, at least) the Sullan constitution. Gruen
downplays the significance of the first triumvirate of Caesar, Pompey and M. Licinius
Crassus, an arrangement which he calls largely a modern construct, and likewise the
renewal of that pact at Luca in 56. Gruen further argues that during the 50s the first
triumvirs, despite their portrayal as a malevolent power pushing levers behind the curtain,
had little actual influence over the elections, with the glaring exception (proving the rule)
being the arranged consulships of Pompey and Crassus in 55.3 As for the constitutional
climax of the decade – the bizarre sole consulship of Pompey in early 52 – Gruen is not at
all perturbed, saying that the innovation had legitimate roots in the Republican
dictatorship.4 Along similar lines, Gruen argues that the frequency of bribery
prosecutions in the last decades does not prove an increased frequency of bribery itself,
since the prosecutions often had political motives. To him the episodes of political
violence so often attested in our sources were typical of pre-industrial societies, were
usually staged anyway, and did not reflect a desire to tear down the government (“It
would be a mistake to equate turbulence with revolution”). Even the Catilinarian crisis of
63 “did not shake the foundations of the state.” To Gruen the government was in no real
danger of toppling; the conspiracy of Catiline, in fact, strengthened awareness of a
common interest in stability.5

For Sullan continuity in the 70s, see Gruen, Last Generation, 126; for his views on the consuls of the 70s
and 60s, 140; for the significance of the triumvirate as largely a modern construct, 90; for the overstatement
of Luca, 101; for the relative continuity of elections in the 50s, 141.
4
Gruen, Last Generation, 153.
5
For bribery trials as politically motivated, see Gruen, Last Generation, 160; for his argument on the role
of violence, 405; for his view on the Catalinarian conspiracy, 431.
3
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Others closer to the present day have followed Gruen. K.M. Girardet in 1996
concurred in blaming the dynasts and not a systemic weakness: “Nein: die römische
Republik ist nicht ,gescheitert’, sie ist systematisch und zielgerichtet zerstört worden.”6
A. Yakobson, in his influential recent work on Republican elections, held that violence,
bribery and other irregularities did not overly affect the outcome of affairs until late in the
Republic.7
But the evidence for instability in the late Republic is considerable, as we will see in
detail in the category-by-category survey of electoral abuse. Gruen forces his argument in
several places. He and his successors must vie against a historiographic tradition that
goes back to our original sources. For good reason, Roman history textbooks
unanimously begin their chapters on the fall of the Republic in 133 B.C. Velleius
Paterculus beats them to the punch by nearly two millennia with his observation that after
the death of Tiberius Gracchus the rule of law gave way to power, civil disagreement
turned to violence, and wars were fought for profit rather than for rightful cause.8 Even if
we allow for Cicero’s histrionics, the corpus of his work shows his awareness of the
fraying of the state. Sallust, admittedly, was prone to complaining about his times, and
oversimplified a complex problem as a bipolar struggle. But he perceptively assesses the
demoralizing effects of total victory over Carthage and Rome’s achievement of
unchallenged superpower status:
6

K.M. Girardet, “Politische Verantwortung im Ernstfall: Cicero, die Diktatur under der Diktator Caesar,”
ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ: Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller zum 65. Geburtstag am 28.Januar 1996 (Stuttgart: Teubner,
1996), 249. For another argument on stability, see K.-J. W. Welwei-Bochum, “Caesars Diktatur, der
Prizipat des Augustus und die Fiktion der historischen Notwendigkeit,” Gymnasium 103 (1996), 477-97.
7
A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome. A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999), 113.
8
Vell. 2.3.3: Inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque civium antea condicionibus
sanan solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit.
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And so the nobles began to take advantage of their status, and the
people abused their liberty in wantonness, and each man led
himself into robbery and pillage. In this way the whole was divided
in two, and the state between these extremes was torn to pieces.9

The modern scholarship also is overwhelmingly in favor of “decline” and we will see in
each category that the authors who specialize in that subtopic – bribery, violence and so
forth – conclude that the abuses become more frequent and more serious at the end. P.A.
Brunt, in his own Fall, concludes that the Republican constitution simply could not
withstand the pressure when all players in the system wielded their obstructive powers to
the utmost. The senate was blind to the pressures that resulted from imperial expansion
and the Italian problem, while the equites, the plebs, the peasantry and the soldiers ripped
the state apart.10 L.R. Taylor11 recognizes the pressures coming from the knights, the
Italians and the army warlords, as does D. Shotter.12 In support of the argument that there
were structural forces behind the rise of electoral abuse in the late Republic, H. Mourtisen
argues its cause was increasing competition for power and status.13 A.W. Lintott, despite
an overall argument in favor of constitutional flexibility, admits that the abuse of form
had an effect: the “conflict and near-anarchy” of the last years typified “a loss of
credibility in institutions traditionally regarded as authoritative – the senate and the

Sall. Iug. 41.5: Namque coepere nobilitas dignitatem, poplus libertatem in lubidinem vortere, sibi quisque
ducere, trahere, rapere. Ita omnia in duas partis abstracta sunt, res publica, quae media fuerat, dilacerata.
The author’s translation.
10
Brunt, Fall, 81.
11
Taylor, Party Politics, 17.
12
D. Shotter, The Fall of the Roman Republic (London: Routledge, 1994), 97.
13
H. Mouritsen, Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 126.
9
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higher magistracies in the city.”14 In another work, Lintott further acknowledges the role
of procedural abuse in the collapse with a telling comment: “Moral failure did in fact
contribute to the overthrow of the Roman Republic but it lay in the choice of means
rather than the choice of ends.”15 This debate, then, between the stability or instability
and the effects of constitutional abuse looms over our discussion of irregularities in the
elections.
A second relevant theme in modern scholarship concerns the degree to which the
Republic was really “democratic,” in the sense that the voting assemblies and the
plebeian population had a say in affairs. The traditional view of late 19th- and early 20thcentury scholars, particularly T. Mommsen and M. Gelzer, was that Republican Rome
was an oligarchy with the citizen assemblies effectively controlled by patron-client
relations. The consensus was that Polybius had been duped when he enthusiastically
described Rome’s “mixed constitution” as one of checks and balances among monarchy
(the magistrates), aristocracy (the senate) and democracy (the assemblies).16 In 1939, R.
Syme characterized the Augustan transformation as an oligarchic revolution, and he
propounded a much-quoted dictum:

In all ages, whatever the form and name of government, be it
monarchy, republic or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the
façade, and Roman history, Republican or imperial, is the history
of the governing class.17

A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 213.
Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 208. Emphasis supplied.
16
Polybius’ well-known constitutional analysis is set out in the sixth book of his Roman history. Polybius,
The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. B. Radice; intro. F.W. Walbank (London: Penguin Books, 1990).
17
R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 7.
14
15

8

This patron-client model for Republican politics became the orthodox view, and many
subsequent scholars such as Taylor and H.H. Scullard agreed. Taylor, before her later
work on Republican voting assemblies, stated flatly that at the annual elections, “nobles
and senators determined the outcome under the system of personal commendation.”18
Orthodoxy is created to be challenged. In the latter 20th century new generations of
Republican scholars argued there is simply too much evidence that the power of the
populus Romanus was real and discretionary, that it mattered a great deal in the outcome
of contested elections and debates, and that rather than commanding the masses, the
nobles had to court popular favor to win elections and support for their causes. Foremost
among these latter-day scholars is F. Millar, whose works from the 1980s onward
explored the importance of oratory and mass opinion and showed the lengths to which the
candidates and nobles went to seek popular favor. Millar states:

Far from being a tightly controlled, “top-down” system, the late Republic
was on the contrary a very striking example of a political system in which
rival conceptions of state and society, and rival policies, as regards both
internal structures and external relations, were openly debated before the
crowd in the Forum.19

Because election to the magistracies constituted admission to the senate, Millar sees the
popular assemblies as the grantor of status, not its servant. True, the fasti of consuls show
an overwhelming preference for aristocrats, but Millar and several others replied that
these lists merely show a customary deference to noble status, and the preference of the
Taylor, Party Politics, 75.
19 F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1998),
7. See also his work from the 1980s onward on the democratic nature of the Republic in The Roman
Republic and the Augustan Revolution, H. M. Cotton and G. M. Rogers, eds. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University
of North Carolina Press, 2002).

18
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crowd for a certain political pedigree in their choice of candidates.20 R. Morstein-Marx
agreed in 1998: “There is no reason why this should not have come about by the free
exercise of the vote, as is implied, for example, by popular leaders’ criticism of the
People for perpetuating their ‘slavery’ by means of their own votes.”21 Brunt concurs that
a “splendid lineage” could be a fine asset in competitive elections.22 G. Hopkins and K.
Burton, in an interesting analysis of the Republican aristocracy, point out that the
argument for control by the “nobility” ignores the rise and fall of individual families, and
show that surprisingly small percentages of men of consular rank either descended from,
or were ancestors of, consuls in the immediately surrounding generations.23
Yakobson’s 1999 Elections and Electioneering points out that the mass-scale bribery
depicted in ancient sources would hardly have been necessary if elections were a
foregone conclusion. He concludes: “Polybius knew what he was talking about after
all.”24 E. Deniaux, in a study of the use of urban space in the Republic, notes the array of
spectacle, the necessity of physical presence and direct appeal to voters, and the role of
oratory and entertainments associated with forming public opinion, all of which involved
the whole city: “Tout ceci permet de reenforcer l’hypothèse d’une forme de commication

Millar, Roman Republic, 133. Even in the U.S. system, voters have favored more than one candidate
from certain well-known families, including Adamses, Roosevelts, Kennedys, Bushes and Clintons.
21
R. Morstein-Marx, “Res Publica Res Populi,” review of A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in
Rome, SCI 19 (2000), 229. Morstein-Marx specifically cites Sallust’s speech of Macer (Hist. 3.48.6),
castigating the people for their choices.
22
Brunt, Fall, 28.
23
G. Hopkins and K. Burton, “Political Succession in the Late Republic, 249-50 B.C.,” in Death and
Renewal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For the rise and fall of gens, see p. 38; for the
statistics on consular descendants, 32.
24 Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering, 233.
20
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écrite dans la campagne électorale romaine. Ces quelques remarques imposent donc
l’ideé d’une participation de la ville entière à la préparation des elections.”25
Our primary sources contain many indications that elections involved the free
expression of popular will. Cicero informs us that a consular candidate in 65 B.C. loses
by only a few centuries, the voting units in the consular electoral assembly, indicating a
split decision (paucae centuriae ad consulatem defuerent). In a letter Cicero approvingly
notes that one of Milo’s assets as a consular candidate for 52 B.C. is popular appeal. In a
defense oration Cicero commiserates with his fellow leaders of the state that they must be
“tossed about by the waves and storms of popular favor.”26 The younger M. Porcius Cato
provides a negative example: by refusing to kowtow to the electorate in the usual fashion
in 52 he failed to win office.27 Speaking most directly the point is the Commentariolum
Petitionis attributed to Q. Cicero, a sort of “pocket manual” for candidates, stressing the
importance of remembering names (nomenclatio), manner (blanditia), persistence
(adsiduitas), generosity (benignitas), a public buzz (rumor), and impressive manner
(species in re publica).28 We even know of the modern-sounding gaffe of a consular
candidate who makes an unfortunate joke after shaking the callused hand of a working
man; the angry reaction spreads throughout the city and he is defeated.29

25 E. Deniaux, E. “De l’ambito à l’ambitus: les lieux de la propagande et de la corruption électorale à la fin
de la République,” in L’urbs: espace urbain et histoire (Ier siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.C.), (Rome:
Actes du colloque international organisé par le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique et L'École
Française de Rome, 8-12 mai 1985), 304.
26
See Brut. 237 for the close vote; for Milo’s popular appeal, Fam. 2.6.3; for being subject to public
opinion, Planc. 11;
27
Plut. Cat. Min. 49-50; Dio 40.58.
28
This summation is from R. Morstein-Marx, “Publicity, Popularity and Patronage in the Commentariolum
Petitionis,” Cl. Ant. 17 (1988), 41-53.
29
Val. Max. 7.5.2.
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So successful have been the arguments of Millar and his colleagues that a counterreformation has arisen. If Rome was not a top-down oligarchy, neither was it exactly the
Athenian democracy – the democratic argument, these scholars reply, goes too far in
downplaying the important role still played by the senate and the nobiles and the
restraining influences of tradition, religion and culture. Mouritsen points out that
participation in the actual democratic process was limited both by the physical aspects of
the city and by the distances of the growing empire. The contiones, or public debates, that
Millar and others cite as examples of the rough-and-tumble democracy were quite often
merely staged events. Mouritsen notes there are only a handful of documented cases in
which a voting assembly rejected a legislative proposal once it had been put forth.30 In a
2000 article, K.-J. Hölkeskamp criticizes Millar for focusing too narrowly on the
legislative and electoral machinery while ignoring the considerable unwritten gravitas of
the senate and the moral authority of the mos maiorum. Hölkeskamp sees the electoral
assemblies more as a tool used to allot power among the elites.31 J.A. North, in a muchquoted passage, cautions that the semblance of competitive elections lasted only as long
as there were divisions within the elite, and quickly disappeared once a single despot (or
triumvirate) took power: “The moment that competition ceases... voters’ opinions can all
too soon lose their importance to those holding power.”32

For Mouritsen’s argument on the staged nature of the contiones see Plebs and Politics, 52; for his views
on the physical limitations on participation, 32.
31
K.-J. Hölkeskamp, “The Roman Republic: Government of the People, by the People, for the People?”
Review of F. Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic, SCI 19 (2000). For his “machinery”
argument, see 212-213; for his view on the assembly as a power-distribution device used by elites, 219.
32
J.A. North, “Democratic Politics in Republican Rome,” P&P 126 (Feb. 1990), 21.
30
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On balance, however, the evidence shows that the will of the electorate played more
of a role in the affairs of the Republic than allowed in the rigid patron-client model. The
leaders of Rome were chosen by the people, answered to them, strove to persuade them,
catered to them, entertained them and bribed them. There was some freedom of choice in
the elections and some unpredictability as to their outcome. All of this supports the
conclusion that the elections were, indeed, the centerpiece of the Roman political process.
Yakobson makes a vital point: “It was precisely because the people’s prerogative – their
suffrage – was real rather than specious, because it gave them a real (albeit limited) stake
in the system, that the people accepted the Republican political system as legitimate.”33
The elections mattered to the citizens immensely – and so therefore did the battering of
the electoral process that presaged the end of the Republic. Millar gets the last word, with
a rhetorical flourish:

Was all this a charade managed from above – the election of over
fifty office-holders a year, the declaration of war and the voting on
treaties, the passing of legislation, the trials of office-holders and
private citizens? 34

Problems in Defining ‘Abuse’

Every year was an election year in the Republic. After the expulsion of the kings,
which occurred in 509 B.C. according to legend, Rome was typically governed by
annually elected magistrates. These magistrates included two consuls with supreme
33
34

Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering, 229.
Millar, Roman Republic, 150.
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military command and collegial authority, a varying number of praetors, aediles and
quaestors with lesser functions, and the tribunes of the plebs. In addition to these annual
officers, a pair of censors served five-year terms, with power to revise the citizenship
rolls and to regulate the membership of the senate and public contracts. In times of crisis
during the early and middle Republic, the government could suspend normal operations
and appoint a dictator, whose authority superseded the regular magistrates. But the
dictator was usually named to address a specific problem; his term was limited and the
institution of the dictatorship served its purpose without being overly abused.35 Lastly, in
the event that the terms of sitting magistrates had expired without new elections to
replace them, the senate could name an interrex, a temporary magistrate to preside over
new elections.
The magistrates were elected by the popular assemblies, the comitia:
* The comitia centuriata, organized by military “centuries,” which elected the
consuls, praetors and censors. Because this assembly represented the Roman people
under arms, in the act of granting imperium to their commanders, it met outside the
pomerium on the Campus Martius.36
* The comitia tributa, in which the population was divided into 35 voting “tribes,” in
theory corresponding to geography, to elect the aediles and quaestors.
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Two exceptions from the early and middle Republic do not concern our discussion of latter-day elections.
In earlier practice the consular power was sometimes subdivided amongst a set of military tribunes. Livy’s
Book 3 also tells the colorful story of the board of 10 (decemvirs) appointed to revise the laws but
ultimately forced to step aside after abusing their position.
36
Gellius, NA 15.27.5: Centuriata autem comitia intra pomerium fieri nefas esse, quia exercitum extra
urbem imperari oporteat, intra urbem imperari ius non sit. Propterea centuriata in campo Martio haberi
exercitumque. imperari praesidii causa solitum, quoniam populus esset in suffragiis ferendis occupatus.
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* The concilium plebis, which was essentially the tribal assembly sans patricians.
This council sat as a plebeian body to elect the tribunes of the people, with a tribune
presiding.37
All of these assemblies also had legislative authority, although the tribal assembly and the
concilium plebis were the primary lawmaking bodies.
These assemblies were not “democratic” or “republican” bodies in the sense that we
use the terms today. The centuriate assembly, elector of the senior magistrates, was
weighted by property qualifications according to a census. This practice dated from the
time of the kings, and votes weighted for wealth seemed perfectly natural to the Romans
– after all, who better to judge the affairs of the state, than those with the most at stake?
Because the classes voted in descending order, the centuries of the equites (the “knights”)
and the first two of the five property classes often were enough to carry the day.38
Furthermore, censuses were conducted irregularly or not at all, causing the makeup of the
centuries to be more and more unreflective of true conditions. No census was taken
between 86 and 70 B.C., even as the nature of the citizenship changed dramatically in the
wake of the Social War. When Pompey and Crassus finally had a lustrum conducted
during their consulship of 70 B.C., to break the hold of the old guard, the voting-rolls

The best modern summation of the far-and-wide evidence on the nature and workings of the comitia
remains L.R. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). Also see the meticulous work of G.W. Botsford, The
Roman Assemblies from Their Origin to the End of the Republic (New York: Cooper Square Publishers,
1968). The fourth of the Republican assemblies, the comitia curiata, plays little role in our discussion of
electoral procedure.
38
The extent of the upper classes’ control has been the subject of fresh debate as well. Yakobson, Elections
and Electioneering, 20, asks whether the gap between richest and poorest, and the voting-bloc solidarity of
the upper classes, was as pronounced as traditionally assumed. See also Yakobson, “Petitio et Largitio:
Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic,” JRS Vol. 82. (1992), 44.
37
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were nearly doubled.39 It was the only census conducted between the dictatorship of L.
Cornelius Sulla and Augustus.40
Representation also was unequal even in the “popular” assemblies, the comitia tributa
and its alter ego, the plebeian council, which used as their voting units the 35 tribes of the
Roman people. Each tribe had one vote, with the contest decided as soon as a majority of
18 out of the 35 possible votes had occurred. But tribal membership was not equally
assigned: The masses of the city were crammed into four urban tribes, with the propertied
classes comfortably spread out among the other 31. This was a source of long-standing
tension between the classes. Livy with a disdainful sniff tells us that the fourth-century
censor Appius Claudius caused an uproar by distributing freedmen among the rural
tribes, contributing to the election of a particularly disruptive aedile. In 304 the next
censors restored these “the lowest of the low” to their grubby station in the urban tribes.41
During the period with which we are concerned, on the last day of 67 B.C., the tribune
Gaius Manilius brought through a bill that again distributed the freedmen amongst the
tribes. On the following day the senate immediately declared it invalid.42
The state calendar could be manipulated to block assemblies or reschedule them for
politically opportune reasons. Because there were laws that barred the consideration of
legislation for a certain period before an election, and laws governing the minimum time
allowed between the proposal of a law and its passage, the calendar was a familiar
Livy Per. 98.
Plut. (Crass. 13) says that Crassus as censor in 65 “literally accomplished nothing at all.”
41
Livy 9.46.
42
Dio 36.42.2-3. For discussion of the unequal assignment of voters to tribes, see especially L.R. Taylor,
The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic; The Thirty-Five Urban and Rural Tribes, Papers and
Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 20 (1960); see also Taylor, Voting Assemblies, 64; Brunt,
Fall, 24.
39
40
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tactical tool for late Republican politicians. The comitia could meet only on the dies
comitiales, those dates permitted on the Republican calendar, numbering about 195 days
of the year.43 That number could be further reduced. The magistrates could sometimes
control affairs merely by extending or rescheduling festival days. The Romans took the
prohibitions of their calendar seriously: The date of every known meeting of the comitia
from the years 189 to 49 occurs on a day that was comitialis.44 A calculated delay could
be used to discourage turnout or to drive away voters who had expressly traveled to the
city for the assembly, since some delays required the lapse of three market-days
(trinundinum), a minimum of 17 days.45 Yet another factor was the decision to insert, or
not to insert, the intercalary month required to keep the Republican calendar in sync with
the physical year.46
On the day of an election, the presiding magistrate -- typically a consul for the
centuriate assembly, a consul or praetor for the tribal assembly, and a tribune for the
plebeian council – wielded immense power and influence over the proceedings.47 One of
these powers was control of who appeared on the ballot in the first place, since candidates

A.K. Michels, The Calendar of the Roman Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967),
31.
44
Michels, Calendar, 45.
45
F.B. Marsh, “The Gangster in Roman Politics,” CJ Vol. 28, No. 3 (Dec. 1932), 171.
46
Examples of calendar manipulation: Cic. Q Fr. 2.5.2, praising the consul Lentulus for extending the
Latin Festival to occupy the remaining comitial days; Sest. 33 on the attempt by Clodius to expand the
number of legal meeting-days (ut omnibus fastis diebus legem ferri liceret); Dio 40.62.1 on Cicero angling
to prevent an intercalary month so that the electoral terms (and thus his promagistracy) would not be
prolonged; Plut. Mar. 85, on a festival extended to block a vote on a citizenship bill. L.R.Taylor (Party
Politics, 80) suggests that the extravagant thanksgivings voted to Caesar during his Gallic triumphs could
have been intended to reduce the opportunities to pass legislation favorable to him.
47
See Taylor, Party Politics, 71, and Voting Assemblies, 104-5, for a discussion of the power of the
presiding magistrate.
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had to make a valid application (professio).48 The presiding magistrate also could simply
call the whole thing off by announcing unfavorable auspices. In 55 B.C., Pompey,
presiding as consul and unwilling to have the uncooperative Cato as praetor for the next
year, abruptly heard thunder and stopped the vote after the early returns were going
Cato’s way.49 Lastly, when not enough voters of a particular tribe were present, the
presiding magistrate could reassign voters on an ad hoc basis.50
The key point to remember is that all this was the “normal” Republican practice and
was not considered abusive in itself, a conclusion based on the Romans’ own attitudes
toward these routine manipulations. In his 1999 book on the Republican constitution,
A.W. Lintott notes that the political system was fluid and flexible and not easily
subjected to proof that it had been “violated.” He says of the system that it:

was not something fixed and clear-cut, but evolved according to the
Romans’ needs by more means than one. It was also inevitably
controversial: there were frequently at least two positions which could be
taken on major issues.51

With all its warts, the Republican system served as a functioning government for nearly
five centuries. So when we use the term “electoral abuse” to describe the events of the
See Cic. Leg. 43 on the duties and powers of the presiding magistrate; also Asc. 89C. For examples of
presiding consuls controlling the slate: Livy 24.7.10 for the year 215, when the presiding consul stopped
the vote after early returns and demanded that the voters elect better commanders versus Hannibal; Livy
37.47.6 on M. Lepidus Aemilianus rejected by Fulvius in 190; App. Pun. 112 on Scipio’s rejection as
consul for 147, although the people forced his election anyway; Val. Max. 3.8.3 for 67, when Piso refused
to acknowledge the candidacy of Palicanus; Asc. 82C, for the rejection of Catiline’s professio for 65; Cic.
Dom. 112 for the switch of Appius Claudius’ candidacy from aedile to praetor in 58 with the consul’s
consent; Dio 39.27 for the rejection of the candidacy of Pompey and Crassus as consuls for 55. For
skepticism about Cicero’s claim on Appius in 58 see C.F. Konrad, “Notes on Roman Also-Rans,” in J.
Linderski (ed.), Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic (Stuttgart: Steiner,
1996) 103-143.
49
Cic. Q Fr. 2.8; Plut. Cat. Min. 43; Pomp. 52.1-2.
50
Cic. Sest. 109.
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A.W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 7.
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final years of the Republic, it means something beyond our judgment of what is “unfair”
about these practices according to our own, anachronistic standards. The problem of
defining abuse is further complicated by the fact the Romans had no written constitution,
making it more akin to the modern British system than to the formal document employed
by the U.S., where an act or law is unconstitutional precisely when the Supreme Court
declares it to be so. Hence the problem as posed by C. Nicolet: “la limite entre ce qui est
permis et ce qui est défendu, ce qui est normal et ce qui est exceptionnel.”52
Nevertheless, the Republic was governed by a sturdy combination of legislation, legal
precedent and, most important of all, the mos maiorum, literally, the ways of those
Romans who had come before. It does not do justice to that term to describe it merely as
the “customs” of the Republic, because the phrase to the Romans carried a profound
shared political and cultural weight.53 The fact that no written document had “created”
the senate, the assemblies or the elections, nor the ancient restrictions concerning
imperium and the pomerium, made no more difference than the fact the Queen of
England’s job is not “created” by a piece of paper, nor that the monarch’s powers and
roles have changed considerably over the centuries. We get a sense of the moral force
carried by the mos maiorum when Cicero uses its authority to chastise Lepidus in the
Thirteenth Philippic:

Does it become virtuous men to do every thing which it is in their
power to do? Suppose it to be a base thing? Suppose it to be a
mischievous thing? Suppose it be absolutely unlawful to do it? ...
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C. Nicolet, Le métier de citoyen dans la Rome républicaine (Paris, 1976), 322.
See Lintott, Constitution, 4-6, for a discussion of the significance of the mos maiorum in the government
of the Republic.
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But it is not lawful for any one to lead an army against his country,
if indeed we say that that is lawful which is permitted by the laws
or by the usages and established principles of our ancestors. For it
does not follow that whatever a man has power to do is lawful for
him to do; nor, if he is not hindered, is he on that account permitted
to do so. For to you, O Lepidus, as to your ancestors, your country
has given an army to be employed in her cause. With this army you
are to repel the enemy, you are to extend the boundaries of the
empire, you are to obey the senate and people of Rome, if by any
chance they direct you to some other object.54
It was this government of laws (leges), precedent (institutum) and the mos maiorum that
came under systematic assault in the Republic’s final years. As we will see, the Romans
themselves recognized violations of these principles as unconstitutional.
We might then establish three levels of classification in our quest to define “abuse”:
(1) those things which were explicitly contrary to law – and the source accounts will give
us many examples; (2) those which were not explicitly forbidden, but which were without
precedent, and were recognized as contrary to the spirit of the constitution; (3) those
which had precedent, or technically might have fallen within the scope of Republican
practice, yet which were employed by all sides and factions, with each claiming its
actions to be justified, with a frequency and a cynical motive far removed from their
original purpose. In the end, like acid, this abuse corroded the confidence the Romans
had in their government, and left it without honor, without faith, and vulnerable to the
subsequent depredations that it would be forced to endure.
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Part Two: Electoral Abuse and the End of the Republic

Categories of Abuse

At the outset it should be said that the attempt to classify electoral abuse by rigid
categories is somewhat artificial. Considerable overlap exists among the categories.
Violence, for example, is the most commonly attested abuse in the late Republic, but it
frequently is the partner of other violations, or serves as an accelerant to propel one level
of abuse to the next degree. Likewise, an election cabal might employ both bribery and
delay to achieve its goals. The most useful approach is to break down the evidence by
theme and then put it back together again in a chronological review.

1. Failure to Hold Elections

The simplest way to avoid an undesirable election result was not to hold the election,
or at least to delay it in hopes of attaining more favorable circumstances. Failure to hold
elections was not entirely without precedent. For example, in 184 B.C. the state decided
not to elect replacement praetors.1 But after Sulla, the practice becomes more frequent
and brazen, beginning with Lepidus in 78 B.C., who refused to hold elections at all and
demanded a second consulship for himself. In early 77, still with no new consuls elected,
1

Livy 39.39.1-15.
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an interrex had to be appointed to preside on an interim basis. “You ask for a second
consulship,” an opponent named L. Marcius Philippus orated against Lepidus in the
senate, “as if you had ever given up your first.”2
Such usurpations were relatively few, however – until the ensuing two decades, when
electoral delay arrives upon the scene as a regular and increasingly cynical tactic. The
trend cannot be denied. There was an electoral delay or an attempted delay for the years,
67, 63-61, 59, and then an annual series of delays in 57-52. In 67, elections for the
following year’s magistrates were delayed for the first time since Lepidus because of a
struggle over legislation concerning electoral bribery. The people had demanded such a
law; the senate deemed it unacceptable and bade the consuls to ram through an alternative
that had to be passed before the elections were held. Violence and tumult ensued.3 Cicero
ruefully notes to his friend Atticus that no one knew when the elections would occur, and
in his speech to the senate supporting a special command for Pompey, Cicero remarks
that he has been chosen by the comitia as praetor-elect three times already – the elections
had been repeatedly delayed before they could be completed.4
If the delay of 67 was employed for mere legislative machinations, the next instance
was more serious, and was brought about by Cicero himself as consul in 63. The famous
conspirator L. Catalina was a candidate for consul for the following year and was said to
be plotting against Cicero’s life. Cicero delayed the elections and confronted Catiline in
the senate, making sure to let the public know he had been wearing armor under his garb

Sall. Hist. 1.77: Alterum consulatem petis, quasi primum reddideris. The author’s translation.
Dio 36.38.39.
4
Cic. Att. 1.11.2; Leg. Man. 2.
2
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because of the threat of violence. When the elections were finally held Catiline was
rejected by the assembly, and he embarked on his subsequent, ill-fated designs.5
The following year, while Pompey was still in the field in the east, he requested a
delay in the elections for 61 so that his legate M. Pupius Piso could stand for office.
Pompey requested an additional delay until he could enter the city and canvass for Piso
personally (he had to wait outside the city until the day of a triumph.) Having been the
beneficiary of several extraordinary dispensations from the law and special commands in
his career already, Pompey no doubt thought the request was commensurate with his
station. The election was delayed at least long enough for Piso – Dio says it was out of
fear that Pompey might otherwise point his army in the wrong direction.6 But Plutarch
says that Cato drew the line at a delay for Piso and prevailed in his insistence that the
elections not be delayed beyond that for Pompey’s return.7 In a similar vein, the elections
were delayed again in 61 while Pompey backed his follower L. Afranius for consul and
another bribery bill was being considered.8
Delays were becoming more routine, and in 59 delaying the election became a blatant
weapon in the bitter rivalry between the consuls Caesar and M. Calpurnius Bibulus. The
latter, after being physically attacked during the forced passage of Caesar’s agrarian
legislation, withdrew to his house for the rest of the year and pronounced all of Caesar’s

Plut. Cic. 14; Cic. Mur. 51. Sall. Cat. 26 has the pre-election machinations, but not the delay.
Dio 37.44.3.
7
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8
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actions to be in violation of the auspices. Caesar cheerfully ignored him.9 Yet a consul of
Rome could not be entirely neutralized: Bibulus managed to have the elections delayed
from July to October, and all the oratory of Pompey and Caesar, who were unpopular at
the time, could not turn popular opinion against the delay. In the public’s mind, the ends
sought by the opponents of the triumvirs justified their means.10
After Caesar’s consulship he left for his new Gallic command in 58 with inoffensive
consuls in place and the new tribune P. Clodius Pulcher to make trouble. Clodius put
through his own legislative program, got his enemy Cicero temporarily exiled (for having
the Catalinarian conspirators summarily executed in 63), and held sway through the use
of his newly legalized gangs (collegia). But force was met with force, and an opposition
led by T. Annius Milo and P. Sestius rose up against Clodius. In 57, Clodius announced
his intention to stand for aedile for the following year; Milo managed to forestall the
elections, initially until November, while angling against Clodius – again, a delay
engineered for sheer political advantage. The situation became ridiculous when there
were no magistrates in office to assign jurors. When the elections were finally held on
Jan. 20 Clodius finished in first place.11
From this point to the death of Clodius and the sole consulate of Pompey in 52,
electoral delays were the annual norm, without exception. With the political tide running
against them in 56, Caesar, Pompey and Crassus struck back with the renewal of their
pact at Luca, including the agreement that Pompey and Crassus would hold the
Plut. Caes. 14; Dio 38.6; Suet. Iul. 20. Suetonius notes that wags began to refer to the year as “the
consulship of Julius and Caesar.”
10
See Cic. Att. 2.21 for the delayed elections and the unsuccessful efforts of Pompey and Caesar to sway
the public.
11
Cic. Att. 4.3; Q Fr. 2.2.2; Dio 39.7.4.
9
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consulship in 55.12 Caesar’s avowed critic L. Domitius Ahenobarbus insisted on running
for consul anyway, failing to get the hint until his entourage was set upon and a torchbearer murdered. The triumvirs met legal resistance as well. Their candidacy was rejected
by the presiding consul for being too late. But they came up with a resourceful response.
A helpful tribune obstructed the elections until beyond the end of 56 so that a more
cooperative interrex would admit their candidacy.13
In 55, according to Cicero, Pompey as consul employed a different tactic: He called
an election for aedile suddenly and unexpectedly early. Cicero gives Pompey credit for
trying to thwart bribery; the more likely reality was that he was trying to forestall bribery
for candidates of whom he did not approve.14 Cato then had his turn against the triumvirs
and attempted to delay the entry of the year’s duly elected praetors into office for a period
of 60 days, rendering them vulnerable for prosecution for bribery. The consuls blocked
Cato’s measure over the hoots of their opponents in the senate.15 The following year, all
the candidates angled for electoral delay, each hoping for his own advantage, some
hoping to emulate the triumvirs by stalling for an interrex while simultaneously dodging
and lodging bribery charges amongst themselves. Not only were no elections held in 54,
but no magistrates for 53 were elected until nearly halfway through the year – after which
the maneuvering for the elections for 52 began at once.16
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As a result there were no elections in 53 for the magistrates of 52. Elections were
repeatedly delayed by violence in the city and the tactics of the candidates. The year 52
opened without magistrates and without prospects for acquiring them. In the literal sense
of the Greek word, Rome had become an anarchy, a state without “archons.”17 Following
the killing of Clodius on the Appian Way on January 18, and the subsequent violence that
led to the burning of the senate-house, the senate desperately concluded that matters were
intolerable, and Pompey was appointed sole consul with the consent of the senate as a fait
accompli – the most irregular “election” of all.18 With Pompey and the senate now
unified, consolidating their position against Caesar as he wrapped up his conquest of
Gaul, and with Clodius dead, Milo tried and exiled and the state shell-shocked from the
tumultuous decade, there was a merciful lull in electoral disruption, though it was only a
calm before the devastating storm to come.
Gruen, in his argument in favor of stability in the late Republic, contends of these
delays that “postponement reflects politics, not upheaval... it does not suggest breakdown
of order in the late Republic.”19 Yet the course of events from Lepidus onward shows an
accelerating, increasingly frequent and blatant use of electoral delay. As we will see in a
later discussion of how the Romans perceived electoral abuse in general, all parties
recognized what was happening; they knew its dangers; they protested its application –
but then employed it themselves when it was their turn. There was not much hallowed
precedent left for Caesar and the second triumvirs to overcome when it was their turn.
An observation by Goldsworthy, Caesar, 346.
Sources for the events of late 53 and early 52: Asc. 30-31C, 48C; Dio 40.46; Livy Per. 107; Plut. Caes.
28, Cat. Min. 47, Pomp. 54. There is no evidence Pompey’s status was confirmed by an assembly: J. Leach,
Pompey the Great (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 157.
19
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2. Abuse of the lex annalis and Successive Terms

Livy celebrates the overthrow of the kings and the establishment of the Republic by
emphasizing what he saw as its signal virtue, one which distinguished the new
government from that of the hated kings. The elected magistrates were prevented from
becoming despots by the simple constraint of their one-year term. He tells us:

Moreover, the first step towards political liberty in Rome consisted
in the fact that consuls were annually elected magistrates – in the
limitation, that is, not of their powers but of their period of office.20

Besides this, a magistrate could not run for new office while holding his current one,
effectively creating a two-year space (biennium) between magistracies and overall age
limits for the ladder of a political career, the cursus honorum.21. In the middle Republic, a
lex Villia annalis was passed upon a tribune’s proposal22 setting minimum ages for office,
with 30 thereafter as the starting-point for the post of quaestor.23 This minimum age in
combination with the biennium effectively set age limits for the rest of the magistracies
up the ladder. In addition to these restrictions, a variety of laws re-enacted over the
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course of Republican history as recently at the time of Sulla24 made it illegal for a
magistrate to hold the same post twice within 10 years’ time.
Even before the late Republic, there were occasional violations of these principles,
sometimes by popular demand. In 213, Scipio Africanus responded to objections of the
tribunes that he was too young for office with the rejoinder that if the voters wanted him
he was old enough.25 In 151, the elder Cato won passage of a lex de consulatu non
interando reiterating the principle against succession after three successive consulships of
M. Claudius Marcellus.26 In 148, P. Scipio Aemilianus returned to Rome to stand for
aedile, being too young to run for consul – yet the assembly elected him consul anyway.
Appian relates that the consuls protested the illegal act, but the citizens insisted that they
“were the judges of the elections, and that, of the laws pertaining thereto, they could set
aside or confirm whichever they pleased.”27 In 131, following in the unsuccessful
footsteps of Tiberius Gracchus, the tribune C. Papirius Carbo tried but failed to win
approval of a measure allowing the tribunes to stand for re-election.28 Nonetheless, C.
Gracchus was reelected tribune a decade later: Appian says that by then a loophole had
been established; that if there were an insufficient number of candidates for tribune in any
given year, the people could return one of the existing tribunes for another term.29
Over the last century of the Republic these irregularities became more common. After
the younger Gracchus, the next major exception was Gaius Marius, who bulled his way
App. B Civ. 100.
Livy. 25.2.6-8.
26
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into the consulship with popular support in 107 to assume command of the wars, then
was returned for an unprecedented string of consulships from 104-100. Marius and his
supporters cited both the precedent of Scipio and the exigencies of wartime.30 His career
included also included a seventh consulship late in his life, during his final struggles
versus Sulla, which he held for only 17 days before his death.31 In 83, Q. Sertorius
opposed the candidacy of the younger Marius for office on the grounds he was only 26 or
27 years of age.32 And we already have seen that Lepidus demanded a second term as
consul in 78. Lepidus was thwarted by Pompey, who was given a command to lead an
army against him. Lepidus fled and died in solitude and grief.33
The career of Pompey is a study in the violation of the laws governing magistracies
and commands. In fact, the twin pillars of his biography are the extraordinary commands
awarded to him in times of crisis by a desperate senate or a clamoring assembly, and the
electoral irregularities connected with his magistracies. Pompey’s first consulship in 70
required a dispensation from the senate because he had not properly ascended the cursus
honorum.34 Interestingly, the modern scholarship on Pompey is unanimously approving
of this irregularity. A.N. Sherwin-White says the senate was “perfectly competent” to
grant the exception, and that after all, the law was not annulled or damaged merely by
being violated.35 A. Goldsworthy deems it “absurd” to think that Pompey should have
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been expected to follow the cursus after his service to the state.36 R. Seager says that to
do otherwise than grant him a dispensation would have been “hardly plausible.”37
Another Pompeian author, J. Leach, finds “a reasonable nature” to Pompey’s arguments
for special consideration.38
In the wake of all this, a note of skepticism is in order about the motives both of
Pompey and of his grantors. Plutarch reminds us of a more ominous aspect to Pompey’s
impending return to Rome in 71:

[I]n all this general desire to see him and to do him honor there
were also present feelings of suspicion and of fear; it was thought
that, instead of disbanding his army, he might go straight ahead
and, by the use of military force and absolutism, make himself into
another Sulla.39

Less than a decade after L. Cornelius Sulla’s dictatorship its memory was still fresh. Now
Sulla’s protégé, to whom Sulla had given the cognomen Magnus, was marching toward
Rome with an accomplished and loyal army. This was the Pompey who, when reminded
by the Mamertines of Messana of their ancient protections under Roman law, delivered
the curt reply: “Stop quoting the laws to us. We carry swords.”40 Pompey also had
behaved cruelly after defeating Cn. Papirius Carbo, a successor to L. Cornelius Cinna and
opponent of the Sullans. After defeating Carbo, a three-time consul of Rome, Pompey
had him thrown in chains, dragged before a tribunal over which he personally presided,
subjected him to a lengthy and abusive examination that offended all who were present,
Goldsworthy, Caesar, 94.
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and ordered him off to summary execution, with the victim pleading at least for a private
place to relieve his bowels before receiving the sword.41 True, Pompey had established a
reputation as a peerless commander and an excellent servant of the state, but these darker
aspects, too, were well-known parts of the picture – and were part of the calculation on
whether to deny to the general, marching with his army toward Rome, the prize which he
could otherwise easily acquire by the methods of Sulla.
Fortunately for the state and to Pompey’s credit he truly preferred acclaim to force,
and he won a relieved huzzah for disbanding his army. But perhaps it is not coincidental
that the centerpiece of his platform as consul in 70 was a remarkably populist measure –
the restoration of the full power of the tribunes, which had been taken away by Sulla, and
which had been the subject of intense struggles in Rome ever since. This was a payoff by
Pompey to the masses and it would have a profound impact on the brief remainder of
Republican history.42 “By destroying the chief support of the Cornelian constitution,”
Botsford opines, “this measure paved the way to its overthrow.”43
Pompey’s second consulship in 55 required other kinds of manipulation but it did not
violate the 10-year rule on succession, which had been reconfirmed by Sulla (no doubt
because of Marius).44 But Pompey’s third consulship came only three years later and was
delivered by fiat rather than regular election. Almost all of the commentators, ancient and
modern, focus on the fact that Pompey was sole consul, an act indeed unprecedented in
the history of the Republic, but they ignore the second violation. Again the reviews are
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forgiving. Leach states of Pompey without irony: “He had in fact a deep regard for the
Roman constitution provided that it could be adapted to suit his own requirements.”45
Another Pompeian scholar praises Pompey because he “never became a law unto
himself.”46 J.P.V.D. Balsdon, writing in 1939 on the eve of world events that would also
display the fruits of unchecked power, was more clear-eyed about the precedent:

After 52 things began to move fast. There was little reason why
Caesar should not attempt to hold a second consulship a year
before his legal time. After Pompey’s third consulship, the lex
annalis cannot have counted for much.47

Again, as we will see, Caesar and the second triumvirs had little worry about trampling
on the precedents of age or term requirements for their hand-picked magistrates. Those
precedents were already well-trampled.

3. Abuse of the Auspices

Polybius, writing in the mid-second century B.C., defined religion as “the element
which holds the Roman state together.”48 In the last century of the Republic it was just as
often a tool for tearing it apart. Religious justification for the obstruction of elections and
legislation grew common and was employed by all parties as a tactical weapon. In due
course not even the masses were fooled by the dueling factions’ claims that the gods were
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on their side. Several scholars have noted the disappearance of the institution of the
dictatorship in the Republic’s final century. They attribute that disappearance to the rise
of two effective substitutes, the first being the so-called “last decree” of the senate, and
the other being the use of religious vetoes.49 Religion, M. Beard observes, “seems to have
become increasingly concerned with issues of control between aristocracy and people.”50
The principal tactic was the declaration of unfavorable auspices by the augurs and
magistrates to block an assembly – or each other – from taking official action on the
grounds that the gods had indicated (typically by lightning or thunder) the day was not fit.
A greater magistrate could use it against a lesser, or a colleague against his equal.51
Cicero notes the seriousness with which the Romans took the augur’s declaration that
affairs must be put off for “another day.”52 Yet in paying lip service to the state religion,
Cicero also reveals its true role in the late Republic by observing that the “immortal gods
often use the auspices to put down unjust measures being pushed by the people.”53 Given
the limited availability of comitial days to begin with, religious veto became part of the
calendar manipulations.54
The lex Aelia Fufia, dating from the mid-second century, was an important change
that ushered in the closing chapter. It extended the power of religious obstruction
(obnuntiatio) beyond the augurs to the magistrates, giving the upper classes an even more
For arguments on the use of the auspices as a tool versus the people see for example Taylor, Party
Politics; Botsford, Roman Assemblies, 117; W.F. McDonald, “Clodius and the Lex Aelia Fufia,” JRS 19
(1929), 165.
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flexible weapon when they opposed a populist measure. R.E. Smith writes that an early
test of the power occurred in 100 with the veto of an agrarian bill, after which “thunder
and the like become common phenomena in Roman political life, and a further step in the
war between tribunes and senate had been taken.”55
As we have seen with the previous categories, in the 50s B.C. the abuse of the
auspices was taken to new extents, and religious obstruction became the frank and
cynical equivalent of a political veto. It was no longer necessary to have seen the omen;
the mere declaration of a magistrate that he intended to “watch the sky” (de caelo
servare) would suffice.56 A pecking-order developed among the magistracies: the greater
could obstruct the lesser via the auspices, and could command the lesser from invoking
the auspices themselves.57 A new stratagem to preempt religious obstruction was
employed in the measure for the recall of Cicero in 57, heard in the centuriate assembly,
for it came with an extra prophylactic clause against sky-watching.58
The decade of the 50s began with the well-known interposition of the consul Bibulus
against the legislation of Caesar and the delay of the elections for 58. When a proposal of
Caesar’s was due for consideration, according to Dio, Bibulus “sent formal notice to him
through his attendants that it was a sacred period and that by the laws he could rightfully
take no action during it.”59 As Beard observes, Caesar ignored the veto but he did not
“get away with” his defiance scot-free. His legislation faced repeated assaults afterward
on the grounds it was unconstitutional, indicating that religious obstruction might be
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resisted, but it still carried some weight. Beard defines the issue as whether Bibulus acted
improperly by trying to cast his veto in absentia, or whether he could be excused because
he was acting under threat of violence.60 The effects of Bibulus’ veto lasted for years, as
the basis for later attacks upon the lex Vatinia, the legislation promulgated during
Caesar’s consulship that awarded him Gaul as his proconsular province.61
The triumvirs personally handled the transfer of Clodius from patrician to plebeian
status so he could stand for tribune in 58. With typical audacity Clodius rearranged the
laws on religious obstruction in his own favor. He engineered a change in the lex Aelia
Fufia, although the exact nature is disputed. No later authority accepts the claim of
Cicero (hardly an impartial critic of Clodius) that the lex had been repealed altogether.62
The most likely interpretation is that to forestall a repeat performance of Bibulus’ tactics,
Clodius changed the law to require the physical presence of the obstructing magistrate.
This theory makes sense in the light of subsequent events.63 Clodius also appears to have
tried to expand the allowable meeting-days for the comitia to all dies fasti.64
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The year 57 saw colorful applications of the changing philosophy toward obnuntiatio.
Early in the year Sestius, the anti-Clodian and now tribune, attempted to break up an
assembly by announcing to the presiding consul that he was taking the auspices. This did
not sit well with the Clodians in the crowd, who, according to Cicero, set upon the
tribune with fence-posts, clubs and swords, somehow managing to spare his life only
because they believed him to be dead already.65 The most dramatic action of the year
came in the elections for aedile. Milo announced his intention to block the consul Q.
Caecilius Metellus Nepos in the style of Bibulus, by obstructing all available days on the
calendar.66 Nepos attempted to conduct the elections on the Campus Martius anyway;
Milo was on hand to forestall him. After that, they agreed as a matter of mutual
convenience to meet in the Forum for the next performance of their two-step. But it was a
double-double-cross; Nepos sneaked out of the city to the Campus anyway – only to find
Milo there ahead of him.67 No wonder the legislation that year in the centuriate assembly
for Cicero’s recall contained a prohibition against watching the sky. As to whether the
Romans believed any of this actually reflected the will of the gods, the sources are silent.
In 55, it was Pompey’s turn to hear thunder when he blocked the election of Cato as
praetor for the following year. The custom to begin the balloting was for a single century
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– the centuria praerogativa, chosen by lot – to cast its ballot first. Pompey invoked the
auspices as soon as the first century returned for Cato and P. Vatinius (Caesar’s useful
tribune) was elected in Cato’s stead.68 Pompey’s opponents judged that turnabout was
fair play: In the debate later that year over the lex Trebonia awarding Pompey and
Crassus their post-consular commands, opponents occupied the senate-house overnight so
as not to be prevented from attending the remainder of the debate in the Forum the next
day. Trebonius locked the doors to keep them inside; at the next day’s assembly Cato and
other opponents scaled each others’ shoulders to try to make themselves heard as they
announced their obnuntiatio. The crowd wounded several of them and, according to Dio,
“killed a few.”69 Again, it should be stressed, the populace did not seem to fear incurring
the wrath of the gods, which demonstrated the devalued currency in which religious
obstruction was now trading. Crassus finished off the year by thumbing his nose at
various augurs, omens, prophecies and intercessions as he departed early for his doomed
command in the east.70 The ensuing year 54 was marked by delays in the elections amid
charges and countercharges of bribery and angling for an interrex, and a veto against
conducting the election was interposed as well.71
Clearly, by the late 50s the religious obstruction of elections was being used routinely
for political means. We might even detect a change in attitudes as the decade progresses.
The opponents of Caesar at least were able to mount some credible claim that his
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legislation had been passed illegally. But in a few years, those who tried to raise such
objections were just as likely to be set upon. From both sides of the transaction, by
cynically using religion to block elections and unwanted legislation, and by ceasing to
accept such vetoes and responding with sneers and violence, the Romans themselves
demonstrate that the significance of obnuntiatio had changed for them.72 One of the
modern Pompeian biographers sums up the cynicism of the decade:

It was politics rather than piety which kept the imaginations of
tribunes and augurs alert for signs of heavenly displeasure on
election days, and it was jobbery rather than justice that swept the
candidates in and out of courts on charges of which the accusers
were as guilty as their defendants.73

4. Violence and Gangs

Political violence in the late Republic is well-attested in the ancient sources and is the
most-explored aspect of its fall in modern literature. The final two decades saw a rise not
only in spontaneous violence, arising from urban conditions and popular frustration, but
also in directed violence of a more organized variety, particularly during and after the
tribunate of Clodius in 58 and his reorganization of the city into vici and collegia. This
organized violence was increasingly directed against the elections in attempts to block the
vote, intimidate the assemblies or simply to delay matters for an interrex. Violence
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escalated in the 50s, reached a crescendo in 52, then receded briefly before the outbreak
of the Civil War.
The mere existence of what Lintott refers to as a “physical element” of Roman
politics was not, by itself, abuse.74 As he notes, notions involving the use of force were
different in the Republican culture than our own; there was an element of “self-help”
concerning justice at the level of the individual and the family, and a common
understanding that force justified force: vim vi repellere licet.75 There was a
corresponding physical component in the Roman practice of government, from the
placement of the curule chairs, to the bench of the tribunes, to the bodily actions of the
players – to block something, you did it in person. The drama of the Republic was played
out in a physical space and in physical actions, in and in front of the Curia, in the
Comitium, in the Forum, at the temple of Castor and Pollux, and on the Campus Martius.
In 62, Cato prevented the reading of a proposal to recall Pompey by the simple expedient
of clasping his hand over the mouth of the reader.76 In 55, as we have seen, Trebonius
locked opponents of his measure in the Curia. On several occasions tribunes exercised
their right of interposition quite literally, setting their chair in front of the prison, the
Carcer, either to prevent someone from being put in, to prevent someone from being let
out, or protect someone inside. When the supporters of Caesar and Pompey drove
Bibulus from the Forum in early 59, they employed the common tactic of destroying his
fasces, the physical embodiment of the consular authority.77 “As was to be the case
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throughout the 50s,” Millar notes, “physical domination of the Forum became a crucial
weapon in politics.”78
As a result, part of the modern debate over violence in the late Republic deals with
whether it was a normal part of life, even in the final years, rather than a harbinger of
collapse. Gruen, particularly, contends that the latter period of violence did not reflect an
overall instability in the state, because it was largely staged by an organized minority
rather than reflecting broad dissatisfaction.79 This somewhat misses the point. The
defining characteristic of late Republican violence, staged or not, was that it was
employed to thwart the operation of constitutional government. The presence of
organized collegia operating with precisely that goal in mind was no less damaging, and
no less a disruption to the elections.
Although it is somewhat artificial to segregate election violence from the rise of
violence in general, the evidence for elections still shows the same pattern of escalation.
At time of violence surrounding the tribune L. Appuleius Saturninus in 100 it was still a
novelty: the murder of the candidate Memmius shocked the state and forced Marius to
move against his Clodius-like associate. One result was the killing of Glaucius, an illegal
but insistent candidate.80 Eighteen years later Sulla, who had seized the state by force,
dealt with an unwanted candidate for consul by a similar expedient.81 With the memory
of the Sullan regime still fresh, the state was eager to give Pompey his dispensation from
the laws to become consul in 70. In addition to Pompey’s virtues, Plutarch reminds us
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there was fear of what he might do otherwise with his army.82 Violence and murder
preceded the consular elections of 67. On the day of the assembly the citizens employed
physical threats against the consul C. Calpurnius Piso unless he accepted the candidacy of
M. Lollius Palicanus. Further violence ensued on the last day of the year when the
tribune C. Manilius forced through his legislation redistributing the votes of the freedmen
among the tribes.83
We do not know the extent to which all these earlier instances of violence were
“organized,” but the dynamic of violence in the Republic changed dramatically in the 50s
with Clodius. The senate had tried to rein in the influence of organized gangs (collegia)
in the previous decade.84 Clodius not only brought about a law permitting their existence,
but actively organized the city into new vici and collegia of his own.85 This put him
effectively in control of the city: Clodius was now “patron of the urban population,” as
Lintott puts it.86 A modern survey of the use of rumor and the role of communication in
Republican Rome describes the collegia as an “information system” that allowed Clodius
to put his spin on affairs out to the population.87 Soon a network of counter-gangs was
organized by Clodius’ opponents, notably Milo and Sestius. Much of the violence of the
remainder of the decade was generated between these two poles.88
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In 57, Milo responded to Clodian violence by having the elections delayed (Clodius
had already announced his candidacy for aedile for 56).89 The following year, the senate
was outraged at the tactics of Pompey, Crassus and Caesar to have the elections delayed
for their rigged consulship. Cato tried to whip up public opinion in the Forum. Clodius,
operating on the side of Pompey, stormed the senate and might have been killed by the
knights had not an angry mob interceded on his behalf, “bringing fire and threatening to
burn his oppressors along with the senate-house if they should do him any violence.” 90
Thus Clodius was spared and the elections were delayed after all. When the defiant
Domitius (at Cato’s relentless urging) refused to withdraw his candidacy, despite the
open secret that the consulship for 55 was reserved for Pompey and Crassus, he was set
upon in public and one of his torch-bearers murdered. The triumvirs sealed the deal by
surrounding the assembly with armed men.91 When elections were held later in 55 for
aediles the violence continued and several deaths resulted; Pompey was unharmed, but
the violence came so close to him that his clothes were wet with blood.92
No elections were held in 54 for 53 because of a variety of bribery scandals, and no
magistrates took office until late in the year. Immediately the convulsions began over
elections for 52, in which Milo was standing for consul and Clodius for praetor. On the
voting-day Clodius and his supporters stormed the assembly and were repelled by Milo’s
forces. Subsequent attempts to hold elections either were delayed or ruined by violence.
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During the frequent fighting, the consuls were assailed on the Via Sacra and one of them,
Calvinus, was even wounded.93 Plutarch describes events:

Often, before an election was over, the place where it had been was
stained with blood and defiled with dead bodies, and the city was
left with no government at all, like a ship adrift with no one to
steer her.94
And so the year 52 opened without magistrates. When an interrex, Lepidus, could be
appointed, supporters of Clodius stormed his home and demanded an election be held
before it could next be legally called.95 On January 18, 52 B.C., the forces of Milo and
Clodius met on the Appian Way and Clodius was killed. His supporters rioted in the
Forum; the fires spread from the pyre and burned down the Curia. The conscript fathers
had had enough. The senate, with even Cato’s consent, appointed Pompey sole consul.
Among Pompey’s first acts were a series of laws de vi that brought matters under control,
until the greater violence to come in 49.96 Says Lintott: “The transition from fighting in
the streets to fighting with armies in the field is essentially one of scale.”97
It is difficult to see how a rising tide of electoral violence in the late 50s that finally
led Rome to delay elections several years in a row, and to abrogate a nearly 500-year-old
tradition of dual consulships, can be considered a normal course of events. Violence had
become the accepted way of achieving desired ends. In an interesting interdisciplinary
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study of “collective behavior” in the late Republic, P. Vanderbroeck reaches this
conclusion about violence:

Because politicians regularly turned to the people in order to
pursue an opposition policy against the senatorial majority,
because precedents were constantly established, because violence
was accepted as a political means, and because the same
behavioral patterns constantly repeated themselves, a
conventionalization occurred: collective behavior received a
regularized and repetitive character in the political process and
deviated from existing norms of accepted collective behavior, such
as existed, for example, in the popular assemblies.98

Brunt takes note of the fact that the late Republican violence was used across the board
and did not originate from a single sector of society.99 Lintott agrees that the violence of
the period stemmed not from one man’s domination, but from “conflict and nearanarchy” that arose directly from the loss of faith in institutions.100 Electoral violence in
the Republic had become the norm, not the exception. It was perfectly natural that, as
Suetonius tells us, the original plan of the conspirators against Caesar was to murder him
as he presided over an election.101
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5. Bribery and Electioneering Abuses

Bribery and electioneering laws date to the early Republic. Livy tells us that in the
year 432, the tribunes passed a law against the practice of candidates of whitening their
togas, which was associated with the abuses involved in canvassing for votes.102 There
were laws against bribery passed in 358, 314 and 181, the latter carrying a penalty of 10
years’ disqualification from office, and yet further legislation against bribery (ambitus) in
151. As these laws continued to be passed until the end of the Republic and even under
Augustus, their effectiveness can reasonably be questioned.103 The increase in the number
of praetors to six in the year 197 only increased the competition for consulships, and
hence the role of bribery and electioneering. Marius was accused of bribery; so was
Sulla.104 And yet, in a pattern familiar by now, the abuse of electoral bribery grew worse
and worse over the final century, and especially in the last two decades of the Republic.
Allegations of bribery surfaced in almost every year between 67 and 50 B.C.105
As to what precisely constituted the crime of ambitus, even the Romans were not
always sure. Direct payments in exchange for votes was a clear-cut violation – but
candidates always danced around the laws with goodwill payments to ward-heelers
(divisores) and with generous public dinners, games and exhibitions and other
102
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extravagance. Cicero as consul in 63 brought about a law forbidding public games and
exhibitions by candidates, even well in advance of their announcement for office, unless
they had been directed to do so in a will.106 Lintott, in his survey of Republican bribery,
jokes that “bribe” was an irregular verb conjugated thusly: “I take care of my friends, you
are recklessly generous, he bribes.”107 In the present-day debate over just how democratic
the Republican system was, advocates for the power of the populus cite the necessity of
electoral bribery as evidence that the voters had to be courted.108
The period 67-60 begins with a lex Calpurnia against bribery, forced upon the
consuls Piso and Manius Acilius Glabrio by the senate as an alternative to a more radical
popular measure.109 The law was used to prosecute the winning candidates of 66,
including the younger Sulla; their victories were nullified and new elections were held.110
Catiline, too, was caught up in the law and his first candidacy for consul was blocked.111
In 63 Caesar racked up such enormous debts for bribery in his quest to become pontifex
maximus that he warned his mother on the day of the vote he would come home that
evening either successful, or not at all.112 The elections of 63 for 62 were riddled with
bribery allegations; in one assessment the candidate Servius Sulpicius Rufus “had the
disadvantage of being an honest man” who spent more time trying to prove charges
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against his rivals than winning election.113 Crassus is accused by Cicero of bribing the
jurors to acquit Clodius in his trial in 62 on charges that he had defiled a religious
occasion, and Pompey spent heavily “among the tribes” to win a consulship for his legate
L. Afranius in 61.114
The consulship of Caesar in 59 was purchased with the money of his rich running
mate L. Lucceius, with a certain Q. Arrius, a partisan of Crassus, as the bagman.115
Unfortunately for Lucceius, the other side managed to split the ticket and bring about the
election of Bibulus as Caesar’s colleague, relying heavily on bribery as well – even Cato
justified the practice as a necessary evil.116 The first triumvirs took the consulship for
Pompey and Crassus in 55 by cabal rather than purchase, but once in office they took
measures to make sure bribery occurred only in their favor. They blocked efforts by Cato
to delay the inauguration of the elected praetors so they could be prosecuted.117 Cicero
says Pompey’s ploy of holding unexpected elections for aedile was meant to forestall
bribery, and during the year Crassus brought about his own lex Licinia to crack down on
electioneering.118 Ward, in his book on Crassus, says it all was calculated and the
triumvirs were simply trying to restrict the ability of their opponents to maneuver against
them: “They had the resources to circumvent their own electoral ‘reforms’.”119
The year 54 was a veritable Super Bowl of electoral payoffs. All four of the consular
candidates were eventually prosecuted and the elections for 53 were delayed well into the
Ward, Crassus, 170; Cic. Mur. 43-49 for the campaign.
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next year. Bribery was so rampant and money flowed so freely that in July 54, interest
rates rose in the city.120 In early August the cat was out of the bag: one of the candidates,
Memmius, confessed to a plot involving a fellow candidate and the sitting consuls to
reward the centuria praerogativa the sum of 10 million sesterces for its vote.121 The
senate voted for an inquiry; a tribune blocked it; the senate postponed the election while
it took its case for an inquiry to the people; a tribune vetoed it again. The senate called
the election anyway, resulting in another veto.122 Elections for 53 finally were held
halfway through that year. For the following election for 52, at least, there would be no
need for bribery to determine the winner – the murder of Clodius, riots in the city and the
sole consulship of Pompey took care of that. Not surprisingly, one of his first acts after
taking power was a widely praised, harsh crackdown on further electoral bribery.123
In its final two decades the Republic tried to restrict the abuses of ambitus with
legislation in 67, 63, 55 and 52, but the practice continued unabated, if not even more
brazenly. “The multiplication of senatorial decrees and laws on corruption,” Brunt
concludes, “is alone proof that evil was rampant.”124 Gruen argues that the frequency of
laws and prosecutions do not signify growing instability:

Can one be sure that the late Republic sinned with greater
frequency in this area than did earlier periods? Prosecutions de
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ambitu do not prove it. They were generally inspired by politics
rather than moral indignation.125

But his point that bribery prosecutions “were generally inspired by politics” does not
matter – whether the prosecutions were “political” or not, they existed, and disrupted the
fabric of the annual elections to the point of abandonment of the constitution.

6. Prearranged Results, Cabals and Conspiracies

The conspiracy of Catiline to take control of the state in the 60s was traced by Sallust
back to the corrupting effects of Sulla’s reign.126 Sallust blamed Sulla for teaching the
post-Marian plebeian army indulgence, greed and degradation, and said that Sullan
veterans were among those eager for civil war to erase their debts. Catiline invoked
Sulla’s victories in his exhortations to his followers.127 While Sallust’s allegations of
what some scholars call a “first Catilinarian conspiracy” in 66 are disputed,128 at any rate
Catiline’s bids for the consulship in 65 and 64 were blocked, and in the elections for 63
he was defeated and began his efforts in earnest.129 During this time Caesar and Crassus,
too, have been accused of plotting to seize power, but either such a plot did not exist or
nothing came of it.130 (Gruen contends that Catiline’s conspiracy was not a real threat to
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the state, and in fact made it stronger, by bringing together the leading elements of the res
publica to oppose him.131)
Events at the end of the 60s were driving Pompey, Crassus and Caesar into each
others’ arms. Pompey, on his way back from his eastern victories, was reduced to bribery
and arm-twisting from afar to arrange the election of his legate Afranius as consul in the
elections of 61 for 60.132 After all his service to the state, Pompey was bitter that the
senate rejected his proposed settlement of the east and would not provide land for his
veterans. Crassus was equally chagrined at his failure to reduce the price of the contract
for the tax-farmers who were his clients. Caesar, having completed his term as praetor,
was serving in Spain and was desperately eager to achieve his first consulship suo anno,
as soon as he was eligible by age, befitting his sense of dignitas. As a result of the pact,
Caesar was elected consul for 59 and his legislative program included relief for his fellow
triumvirs.133 According to Cicero, at least some of these measures were passed contrary
to the lex Caecilia Didia of 98 B.C., which had confirmed the prohibition on considering
legislation within a trinundinum of the election.134 Despite their efforts, however, they
were unable to keep Bibulus from delaying the elections for 58, nor to have their
preferred candidate chosen. They settled for substitutes, one being Caesar’s new fatherin-law by a convenient political marriage.135
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In 56, according to our sources, the three partners renewed their pact in the coastal
city of Luca, with a large part of the senate in attendance.136 Crassus and Pompey would
become consuls in 55 and Caesar’s command in Gaul would be renewed for another five
years. As we have seen, engineering the election required the delay for the rest of 56 to
get rid of an uncooperative consul, and violence to persuade Domitius to drop out, but in
the end it was successful.137 In addition Caesar’s price to his colleagues was to force
Cicero to drop any attempt to revisit Caesar’s agrarian law, passed during his term as
consul in 59. Cicero complied, rationalizing his decision in a letter.138 Meanwhile, the
consuls over the rest of the year cooked the praetorian elections for 54 and arranged their
post-consular commands with the help of the lex Trebonia.
For the purposes of our analysis, the significance of Luca is the unusual directness
with which control of the state was brokered. The sources do not say that Pompey and
Crassus would stand for consulships, that they would enter the field of candidates, that
they would canvass, but simply that they would be consuls for 55. Even the first
consulship acquired by the triumvirate, that of Caesar in 59, at least required competition.
Pompey had to exert himself for Afranius in 61 for 60; neither could the partners rig the
elections entirely as they pleased for 58. But by the middle of the decade they were able
to barter the consulship at their own terms.
The importance of Luca, and the degree of control exercised by the triumvirs, is
disputed by modern scholars who say either the original sources have exaggerated or
Plut. Caes. 21; Crass. 14; Plutarch further reports that there were 200 senators and 120 fasces at the
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137
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misinterpreted the event. They cite the failure of the triumvirs to control the elections for
57, 56, 54 and 53. W.C. Grummel further says that the elections of 59 demonstrated the
dynasts were not in control of the state.139 R. Seager describes Luca as “a fantasy” and
argues that the effort to which Pompey and Crassus had to go to block Cato’s election in
55 demonstrates their lack of control.140 J.F. Lazenby says that Dio’s silence about any
such deal disproves the “Luca legend” and he constructs his own, speculative alternative
motives based on the difficulties Caesar was facing in the war in Gaul.141 Gruen calls the
significance of the first triumvirate “a modern construct” and states that it “made no
fundamental change in the constitutional structure.”142
And yet, the fact that Appian and Plutarch describe Luca – let alone that Cicero
describes it with much chagrin in his correspondence – certainly shows that something
happened there. The argument that the triumvirs failed to control the elections of 57, 56,
54 and 53 entirely overlooks the possibility that they did not need to. After all, in 58 both
Pompey and Crassus had gotten what they wanted; there were unthreatening consuls in
office and Clodius on hand to fight rearguard actions in defense of the Caesarian
legislation.143 Their program and Caesar’s command in Gaul was a fait accompli. When

W.C. Grummel, “The Consular Elections of 59 B.C.,” CJ, Vol. 49, No. 8 (May 1954), 351. And yet one
consul for 58, Gabinius, was inoffensive at best, and the other, Piso, was Caesar’s father-in-law.
140
Seager, Pompey, 127-128.
141
J.F. Lazenby, “The Conference at Luca and the Gallic War,” Latomus, XVIII (1959), 72-74. Lazenby is
taken to task by another scholar for arguing based on the silence of Dio, who says only (39.26) that Pompey
sought an electoral alliance with Crassus. See Colm Luibheid, “The Luca Conference,” C Phil. Vol. 65, No.
2 (Apr. 1970), 93.
142
Gruen, Last Generation, 101.
143
The extent to which Clodius was a puppet of the triumvirs or his own independent agent also has been
the subject of debate. Gruen challenges the view that the triumvirs would have supported Clodius’ collegia
and other parts of his legislative program, with concurrence from Lintott. But Marsh sees the Clodian
violence as a deliberate tool by Caesar to drive Pompey to Luca. See E.S. Gruen, “P. Clodius: Instrument or
Independent Agent,” Phoenix, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer, 1966), 123-130; Lintott, Violence, 196; and F.B.
Marsh, “The Policy of Clodius from 58 to 56 B.C.,” CQ Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan. 1927), 36.
139

52

events turned against them in 56 and Cicero dared to threaten the land law, they took
action to remove that threat and took the chance to arrange matters again for the ensuing
years – by 54 all three again had the commands they wanted, and they did not have the
magistrates (e.g., Cato) they didn’t want. The argument of Seager that Pompey’s
obnuntiatio against Cato in 55 indicates a lack of control is surely weakened by the fact
that Pompey was using it to control the election.144 Lazenby’s speculation that with
Caesar under fire in Gaul, Pompey saw a chance to double-cross him, and that Crassus
tagged along, has no evidence to support it.145 Besides, to borrow Lazenby’s tactic of
arguing based on the lack of evidence, if the triumvirs had tried and failed to impose their
will on other elections during the decade, we would have heard of such a noteworthy
failure in the sources. Finally, Gruen’s observation that the first triumvirs made no
“fundamental change” in the constitutional structure is answered by the fact they did not
need to. Once it suited their purposes, in 52 for Pompey, and in 49 for Caesar, both
proved willing to innovate. If the conspiracy of Catiline showed for Sallust the damage
Sulla had done to the Republic, the consulships of 59 and 55 show for us how its electoral
mechanism could be brought within the power of willful men.

7. Usurpation of Constitution Roles

Among the various usurpations of constitutional roles in the late Republic were the
removal of elected magistrates, abrogation of their power, attempts by the senate to
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nullify the assemblies and vice-versa, and finally the abandonment of electoral form
altogether with the sole consulship of Pompey. In 133 B.C., Tiberius Gracchus decided to
have an obstructing fellow tribune, C. Octavius, removed by a vote of the popular
assembly. Plutarch tells the story with drama: after acquiring 17 of the necessary 18 tribal
votes, Gracchus stopped the voting and entreated Octavius to relent. When he would not,
the deciding vote was cast, and the tribune was physically pulled down from his bench.
Plutarch called the removal “neither just nor moderate.”146 This was an important event,
for it introduced the doctrine that office in the Republic had no independent value or
authority in its own right – only compliance with popular demands qualified the occupant
for continued tenure.147 “Gracchus’ deposition of Octavius could be assailed as a
violation of tribunician sacrosanctity,” Brunt observes, “but he could reply that a tribune
who maimed the assembly by robbing it of its freedom to vote was no true tribune.”148
Vanderbroeck concurs with the significance of the precedent:

The power of the magistrates was no longer accepted or considered
legitimate merely on the basis of their election, but only if coupled
with proper behavior. If that was not the case, the magistracy was
not to be replaced, but the individual, irrespective of possible
constitutional implications.149
The ultimate act of “removal,” of course, came when the optimates had Tiberius killed, as
well as his brother Gaius a decade later.
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In 87 B.C., the consul Cinna was removed from office by his colleague and the
senate. He went to Capua and stirred up supporters with sentiments which, despite his
offenses, were nonetheless reasonable questions about the sanctity of elections: “What
need is there that we should solicit the favor of the tribes in the elections hereafter? What
need have we of you? Where will be your power in the assemblies, in the elections, in the
choice of consuls?”150 In 67, when the people were demanding a special command for
Pompey to relieve the grain supply from pirates (hunger being the best political
argument), a tribune named Trebellius stood in the way. But the proposer of the
command, A. Gabinius, employed the method Gracchus had used against Octavius. This
time, the opponent backed down once the 17th and penultimate vote for his removal was
counted.151 And when the consul Piso allegedly was sabotaging Pompey’s anti-piracy
efforts, the same Gabinius drew up a measure for his removal as well, but was restrained
by Pompey.152 Five years later, the senate “suspended” the praetor Nepos for pressing
Pompey’s recall to Rome. According to Suetonius, Caesar as praetor and one of the
tribunes were suspended by the senate as well for pushing “inflammatory” legislation.
When citizens angry with his suspension surrounded his house, Caesar calmed them,
which won him good will and his reinstatement.153 After this spate of removals practiced
by tribune against tribune, consul against consul, and senate against magistrate, the
attempts abated, but the possibility remained.
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A more indirect route at nullifying the role of elections was to make their winners
powerless. One of Sulla’s most important changes was to strip the 10 tribunes of most of
their powers and their right to seek further office (the latter a measure intended to cut
down on demagoguery). Sulla, meanwhile, revived the office of dictator on his own
terms, with unlimited power and term, and immunity for his actions.154 The only check
on Sulla was Sulla, who rearranged the state to his liking, murdered his opponents – and
then benignly resigned.155 After a decade of agitation, Pompey and Crassus as consuls in
70 had the full power of the tribunes restored.156 E. Badian describes the Republican
tribunate as a “monster” that acquired its role in the government “by a series of historical
accidents.”157 For the rest of the Republic the elected tribunes and the senate tried to use
their powers to circumvent each other. The assemblies seized the power to award the
extraordinary commands of the late Republic, which allowed the dynasts to build their
personal power.158 The senate, in turn, claimed the power to declare various acts of
legislation invalid, often on the grounds they had been passed by force (de vi).159 Lintott
calls this doctrine of annulment “essentially a political weapon of the optimates.”160
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But annulment was not the senate’s only weapon. Increasingly at the end of the
Republic it employed the declaration that the magistrates should take care “that the state
come to no harm.” Caesar describes this as “the extreme and ultimate decree,”161 and in
modern usage it is widely labeled as the senatus consultum ultimum, as though it were an
actual term used in the Republic.162 To Cicero, employing the decree against the
Catilinarian conspirators, it was license for any and all measures, including summary
executions.163 Lintott observes that the decree becomes a substitute for the dictatorship in
the late Republic, with troublesome ambiguity over how much ius can be based on vis
“without ceasing to be ius.”164 Goldsworthy agrees that part of the breakdown of
constitutional government was caused by the senate’s overuse of the last decree.165
This brings us to the climax of the abuse of the Republican constitution. After there
were no elections in 54 because of bribery and violence, after the elections for 53 were
not held until halfway through the year, after the elections for 52 were again delayed
beyond January 1 and the state had no elected magistrates at all, and after the death of
Clodius, riots in the Forum and the burning of the senate-house, the senate resorted to the
last decree yet again.166 Bibulus, that old enemy of Caesar, made the proposal in the
senate that Pompey be named consul sine collega. Even Cato agreed the times justified it.
Pompey was to conduct a levy and to name his consular colleague in two months’ time –
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as long it was not Caesar.167 Pompey quickly drew up legislation to crack down on
violence and bribery. The remainder of the short life of the Republic was spent trying to
negotiate a compromise between Pompey and the senate on the one hand, and Caesar and
his army on the other, to save the state. It did not work.
The modern analysis of Pompey’s sole consulship is divided. Fuhrmann calls it “a
constitutional freak.” Goldsworthy says it violated “the most fundamental principle of
this magistracy.” Taylor calls it “completely unconstitutional” and “a contradiction of the
meaning of the office.”168 In contrast, among the modern authors on Pompey, Greenhalgh
calls the arrangement “the essence of statesmanship” and Leach “a most ingenious
compromise,” while Seager cautions, “The significance of the appointment must not be
exaggerated.”169 Defenders of the sole consulship generally argue that it was deliberately
crafted to be distinct from a pure dictatorship of either the early-Republican or the Sullan
variety. Their argument is that even as a sole consul, Pompey was more constrained than
a dictator by the terms of office and other traditional limits on a consul’s power.170 Gruen
contends that the measure had healthy Republican roots:

The recourse to emergency government possessed antecedents in
Roman history. Indeed the antique institution of the dictatorship
had existed for just such purposes; an interlude of authoritarianism
until normal processes could be resumed. Pompey alone merited
consideration for such a post.171

Asc. 35C; Dio 40.49-50; Livy Per. 107; Plut. Cat. Min. 47; Pomp. 54; Suet. Iul. 26.
Furhmann, Cicero, 120; Goldsworthy, Caesar, 347; Taylor, Party Politics, 149.
169
Greenhalgh, Prince, 80; Leach, Pompey, 157; Seager, Pompey, 144.
170
For an example of this line of argument, particularly on the consul’s fixed term of one year, see R.E.
Smith, The Failure of the Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), 116.
171
Gruen, Last Generation, 153.
167
168

58

And yet, Gruen’s book is named The Last Generation of the Roman Republic for a
reason. There was simply no precedent for violating the core principle of collegiality of
the dual consulship that had existed since the time of the first Brutus nearly a halfmillennium before. The true dictatorship had been legitimate, a device within the
constitutional framework that legally superseded consular authority. Not even the de
facto monarchy of Sulla had lived up to that name. But the office created for Pompey in
52 was a new animal, a sight unseen in the entire history of the Roman Republic. It struck
at the founding principle of the Republican government that had been instituted upon the
overthrow of the kings – the principle that no lone man would ever wield unchecked
power. The Republic’s main bastion against despotism had been seriously weakened.

8. Procedural and Miscellaneous Abuses

We have evidence of a few other procedural and miscellaneous abuses of elections.
Voting in elections, legislative assemblies and the courts had been converted from oral to
written ballot in the late second century. This had a certain democratizing effect on voter
choice, but also drove up the price of bribery. This switch involved the replacement of
the oral vote-collectors (rogatores) with custodians (custodes) of the wax-tablet ballots
(tabellae) and the collection baskets (cistae). 172 It also presented a fresh opportunity for
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Fig. 1. Denarius with reverse depicting a voting scene. Voters receive their ballot and
ascend the pontes to deposit them. (Late 2nd. cent. B.C.) Syd. 548; RRC 292/1.

Fig. 2. Denarii with voting themes on reverse. Top, a voter deposits a ballot marked V
(uti rogas, or "yes") in a collection basket. Taylor 38; Syd. 935; RRC 413/1. Below, a
ballot showing the options A-C (absolvo, condemno) used in the public courts. Syd. 917;
RRC 428/1.
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interference with the process. Marius therefore had the elevated walkways to the ballotbox (pontes) narrowed to prevent harassment and to promote privacy of the vote.173
Nonetheless, Cicero relates the tactics of the Clodians in 61, in voting on whether to
create a special court to try Clodius for the Bona Dea scandal. His supporters occupied
the pontes and distributed ballots that did not give the option of voting “aye.” The young
Cato protested and the comitia was delayed.174
There may have been manipulation of the centuria praerogativa, the first unit to cast
its vote in the centuriate assembly. It was given great importance by the Romans, roughly
akin to our New Hampshire presidential primary. The centuria praerogativa was chosen
by lot but there are suggestions the lot could have been arranged. Cicero says as much
when he notes the choice of a friendly century to cast the first ballot in 59 on Caesar’s
measure for relief for Crassus’ tax farmers. One could choose to believe, Cicero said, that
the selection was a matter of chance -- or a matter of who was sponsoring the law.175
Taylor also infers from an inscription known as the Tabula Hebana, which described
voting procedure in the early Principate, that two of the four urban tribes were excluded
from the lottery for the centuria praerogativa. This would have effectively pre-empted a
large segment of the population from exercising its influence in an early vote.176
Besides the incident in 61 involving Clodius, there are only a few indications of
fraud, stuffing the ballot box or ballot tampering. One reason might be that the candidates
were allowed to name their own custodes in addition to those chosen by the presiding
Cic. Leg. 3.17.38; an indirect reference in Plut. Mar. 4-7.
Cic. Att. 1.14.5: operae Clodinae pontes occuparent; tabellae ministrabantur ita, ut nulla daretur VTI
ROGAS.
175
Cic. Planc. 35: utrum id sortis esse vis an eius qui illam ferebat.
176
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magistrate. The watchful Cato was among the custodes in an election for aedile in the late
50s, representing a candidate who was declared the loser. Cato examined the ballots,
found that many had been executed “in the same hand,” and appealed to the tribunes,
who reversed the result.177 Varro portrays a conversation among a group of citizens
waiting for election results. One supporter dashes off when he hears that one of the
custodes representing his candidate has been caught stuffing the ballot-box.178 Whether
such practices were common, or whether they were hardly necessary in an age of
violence, manipulation, illegality and bribery, Varro does not say.

Culmination, 69-50 B.C.

The constitutional irregularities of the final century of the Republic lead directly from
the Gracchi to Marius, from Marius to Sulla, and from Sulla to collapse. After Sulla there
was a marked acceleration of rule-bending, especially in the two decades before the civil
war. The trend is clear in those two decades in each of the categories we have surveyed:
in election delays or attempted delays (in 67, 63-61, 59, and then annually in 57-52); in
abuse of the lex annalis and the cursus honorum; in the rise of religious obstruction (and
the corresponding lessening of compliance with it); in bribery (almost annual
prosecutions between 67 and 50, overturning some elections and blocking others
altogether); in violence both organized and spontaneous; in power brokered by cabal or
conspiracy; and in the usurpation of the constitutional powers of the magistrates.
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After this thematic survey, it is worth making a chronological recap of the climactic
two decades:
71 B.C. – Pompey’s army approaches Rome as some in the city fear a coup. He is awarded
dispensation from the cursus honorum to be consul for 70.
70 B.C. -- Pompey and Crassus are consuls. The restoration of the tribunes’ power opens a new era of
constitutional strife. A lustrum updates the voting rolls and breaks up the old guard.
67 B.C. – The senate waters down ambitus legislation. Elections are delayed. Piso refuses the
candidacy of Palicanus and is attacked. The assembly awards commands to Pompey, with violent resistance
and threats of removal against a tribune and consul. C. Manilius attempts to redistribute the votes of
freedmen, with resulting violence.
66 B.C. – The senate nullifies Manilius’ law on redistributing the freedmen. The winners of the
consular elections, Sulla and Paetus, are convicted of ambitus and new elections held for replacements.
Catiline is blocked from candidacy by bribery charges.
65 B.C. – Catiline’s candidacy again is blocked. This is the date of his alleged “first” conspiracy.
Crassus is censor but does little.
64 B.C. -- Catiline loses the elections for 63. Cicero is elected. The senate restricts collegia.
63 B.C. – Caesar is elected pontifex maximus by bribery. Cicero is consul. Elections are delayed
because of the plot of Catiline. The Catilinarian conspiracy ends in violence and executions. Cicero extends
the penalties for bribery and restricts public displays by candidates. Bribery allegations in the elections are
rampant. Sulpicius, the main accuser, is unsuccessful as a candidate.
62 B.C. – The senate suspends the praetors Nepos and Caesar but Caesar is reinstated. This is the date
of the Bona Dea scandal of Clodius. There are riots and disturbances at proposals to recall Pompey. The
elections are delayed at Pompey’s request.
61 B.C. – Clodius’ supporters occupy the voting pontes to issue rigged ballots on the question of his
trial. Clodius is acquitted at his trial amid allegations of bribery. Pompey supports his legate L. Afranius for
consul and distributes money “among the tribes.” Elections are delayed for another bill de ambitu.
60 B.C. – Caesar, Pompey and Crassus come to a political arrangement. Massive bribery occurs in the
consular elections. Cato authorizes counter-bribery as a necessary evil. Caesar and Bibulus are elected.
59 B.C. – This is the year of the consulship of “Julius and Caesar.” Caesar passes his agrarian laws by
force. Bibulus attempts a religious veto of legislation for the rest of the year. He delays elections until
October. The lex Vatinia awards Gaul to Caesar,
58 B.C. – Clodius as tribune legalizes and organizes collegia and revises laws on obnuntiatio. Appius
Claudius Pulcher switches races in the election. Violence occurs over the bill against Cicero. Cicero is
exiled.
57 B.C. – Sestius’ obnuntiatio is resisted with violence. Cicero’s recall is passed with the provision
that ne quis de caelo servaret. Milo, Nepos engage in trickery over an election obnuntiatio. Political attacks
occur against the lex Vatinia as invalid. Elections are delayed again by Milo until November. Milo
organizes counter-gangs. Pompey is voted a special grain command.
56 B.C. – The triumvirs confer at Luca and renew their pact. The elections are delayed until 55 for the
benefit of Pompey and Crassus. Violence and protests occur. The senate puts on mourning garb.
55 B.C. – No magistrates are in office on Jan. 1, requiring the appointment of an interrex. Violence
ends the candidacy of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Pompey, Crassus are elected consuls. Cato tries to block
the praetors from taking office. Pompey hears thunder to block Cato’s election as praetor for 54. Sudden
elections are held for aedile; Pompey is spattered with blood. A lex Licinia is passed to restrict
electioneering. A lex Trebonia awards postconsular commands to Pompey and Crassus, with violence
against an attempted obnuntiatio. Crassus departs early, ignoring the auspices and threatening the tribunes.
54 B.C. – No elections are held for consul because of bribery prosecutions and obnuntiatio. Massive
bribery drives up interest rates. C. Memmius confesses to the plot to bribe the centuria praerogativa.
Multiple prosecutions occur, with rampant rumors of an impending dictatorship.
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53 B.C. – No magistrates are elected until July or August. Widespread violence occurs over the
elections for 52; elections are not held this year. Dictatorship is proposed for Pompey, but Cato opposes it.
Clodius assaults a voting assembly and is repulsed by Milo. The consuls are attacked in street and
wounded.
52 B.C. – No magistrates are in office on January 1. A mob storms the house of the interrex to demand
an illegal election. Clodius is killed on January 18, with resulting riots at Rome and the burning of the
Curia. The senate passes a “last decree.” Pompey is made sole consul at the motion of Bibulus, with the
consent of Cato, despite the violation of lex annalis.

E. Deniaux concludes that after 70 B.C., the electoral facade of the Republic
crumbled: “Il semble que les années 70 marquent dans nos texts une sorte de rupture dans
le développement de la brigue électorale.”179 S. Demougin agrees, contrary to Gruen’s
idea that the government remained stable and was ruined only by war: “La décadence
progressive et inéluctable des assemblées populaires, comices centuriates et comices
tributes, commença bien avant l'ultime guerre civile.”180 Botsford opines that after the
Sullan changes, the promagistracy allowed such a free range to ambitious individuals
such as Pompey and Caesar that they began to overshadow the state.181
Gruen bases much of his argument for continued stability in the years 70-50 on the
consular lists. His survey of consuls finds that 16 of 18 in the 70s descended from
consular families, 17 of 21 in the 60s, 20 of 21 in the 50s. The “blue-bloods” were
holding their own against the usurpers. Instead of presaging collapse, the election results
of the 50s demonstrate to Gruen “the abiding strength” of a system that was not easily
shaken.182 Gruen is supported by Ward:
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[I]t is clear that a fairly well-defined optimate group, linked
together by birth, marriage, friendship, and loyalty to the Sullan
constitution, maintained a strong grip on the consulship that could
be broken only by an occasional turn of fortune or by the tenacious
efforts of ambitious and resourceful individuals, such as Crassus,
Cicero, Pompey, or, as in the elections of 60, Caesar.183

And yet, the election of men of consular lineage does not necessarily prove that
“stability” prevailed in the state. If we could, we might ask Bibulus about how stable his
consulship of 59 was, or L. Domitius Ahenobarbus about 55. There were no “bluebloods” elected in 54 because no one was elected. The same is true of 53 for 52, and then
we come once again to the sole consulship. All roads lead to Pompey and Caesar.

Reaction, Acceptance and Rationalization

The Romans reacted strongly to the electoral abuses of the late Republic, which
argues against the idea these usurpations were uncontroversial and routine political
practice. Roman political leaders recognized the abuses as unusual and unacceptable.
They frequently expressed the worry that the constitution was being torn apart. But over
time they accepted the new lawless way of doing things, and there are several examples
in the Republican’s final years of the optimates and the populares, the Caesarians and the
Pompeians, the patricians and the urban plebs turning to the same methods they had
condemned. They consciously rationalized that what they were doing was necessary to
preserve the state against the evils of the opposing parties.
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The decade of the 50s began with an interesting turn of popular opinion against the
electoral pact made by Caesar, Pompey and Crassus that procured for Caesar the
consulship of 59. Cicero, who claimed public opinion was expressed most honestly at
public events,184 relates a spontaneous display of hostility to the triumvirs at a theater
performance that year. When Caesar entered, the crowd fell sullen and silent, only to
burst into warm applause upon the subsequent entry of Curio, much to Caesar’s
annoyance. When an actor uttered the line, “By our misfortunes, you are great,” the
audience erupted with a prolonged ovation – the pun at Pompey’s expense being more
obvious in the Latin, nostra miseria, tu es magnus.185 Cicero pronounced the state
“utterly ruined” to Atticus and said it had traded despots who were popular with the
masses and hated by the boni for masters now universally hated, and thus a far graver
danger.186 Cicero relates that over the summer of 59 Bibulus continued to enjoy “a
wonderful reputation,” despite his delay of the elections, while a pitiful Pompey and a
frustrated Caesar were unable to move the crowd with their best oratory. Bibulus,
meanwhile, hiding in his house, published daily “edicts” against the triumvirs that were
posted in the streets and became quite popular with the public, sometimes containing
risque references to Caesar’s alleged same-sex dalliances with the king of Bithynia as a
younger man. Besides the jest about the date being “the year of the consuls Julius and
Caesar,” Suetonius tells us of another popular witticism that made the rounds in 59:

Cic. Sest. 106 describes the three locations he considered the best indicators of popular sentiment: the
comitia, the contiones and the public games. One author notes that as the comitia had been less kind to
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The event occurred, as I recall, when Caesar governed Rome;
Caesar, not Bibulus, who kept his seat at home.187

In 56, with new attacks pending on the legislation passed under Caesar, the triumvirs
renewed their agreement at Luca and had a tribune block the elections for the rest of the
year. This resulted in public outrage, rioting and criticism from the consuls, and the entire
senate took the unusual step of putting on mourning garb to protest.188 After Pompey’s
high-handed dismissal of the assembly to block Cato’s election there were violent public
demonstrations and proposals to award Cato honors.189 Crassus, too, was the subject of
popular resentment because of the lex Trebonia giving him a command in the east, which
was popularly recognized as a war arranged for his private benefit. Angry crowds
attended his early departure from the city and tribunes and augurs cursed his enterprise;
he threatened the tribunes with violence if they did not let him go.190 As we have seen,
public demonstrations and frequent violence accompanied every electoral disruption for
the rest of the decade.
When it comes to rationalizing the methods of the opposition, the flexible actions and
attitudes of Cato and Cicero are of particular interest. Cato and his supporters used
violence to block the recall of Pompey in 62, and as aedile Cato uncharacteristically
extended a grain-dole to placate the population.191 In 60, Cato accepted the necessity for a
campaign of counter-bribery to offset that of the triumvirs, reckoning it to be a necessary
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evil.192 In the tumult that led to Pompey’s sole consulship in 52, Cato at first opposed the
idea of making Pompey dictator, saying “that the laws should not derive their security
from Pompey, but that Pompey should owe his to the laws.”193 Yet he soon acceded in
the motion of Bibulus to make Pompey sole consul.
Cicero, for his part, resigned himself to a consular law granting Pompey’s grain
command, given that the alternative proposed by the assembly would be worse.194 In his
De Legibus, Cicero says there is nothing more harmful and less civilized to the state that
action carried out by force.195 But in his defense of Sestius, Cicero recognized that law
and justice must at times be defended against violence by violence. Commenting on Milo
and the competition between justice and force, Cicero argues:

He wished to use the first, so that virtue might overcome audacity;
he was compelled to use the other, so that virtue would not itself be
overcome by audacity.196

To his brother Quintus, Cicero rejoiced that an important precedent for the Republic had
been established by Sestius’ unanimous acquittal: the use of force against force was
justified in the service of the common good.197
Many thinkers over the centuries have agreed with Cicero’s reasoning. But the risk in
using force or bending rules in the name of “good” to fight “evil” lies in its practical
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application, in the natural tendency of all people to identify their own interests as “the
good,” and the slippery slope by which any method becomes justified to bring about any
desired goal. If the other side bribes, we will bribe; if the other sides falsely invokes the
auspices, so should we; if our preferred candidate does not meet the rules, we may twist
the rules for the greater good. Seen in the worst light, Caesar was a power-hungry
warlord who disobeyed the command of the conscript fathers to dismiss his legions. But
he had all the pretext he needed after the senate trampled on the vetoes of three tribunes
and sent them fleeing the city. He, too, would defend the Republic.

Further Abuses of Caesar and the Triumvirs

Caesar initially pretended to obey electoral forms after taking power in Rome in 49.
After being named dictator and claiming the legitimacy of that Republican title, he
conducted elections for 48 in which he was chosen consul with a colleague.198 Caesar
was careful to note it was his legal year.199 But in the offices and honors he arranged for
himself he quickly departed from the norm. In 48, he was accorded the power to stand for
consul five years in succession.200 In 47, he was made dictator for a year.201 In 45 and 44,
he was made consul for 10 years, prefect of morals and dictator for life.202 In the extent of
his extraordinary powers, Caesar had become a second Sulla.
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Caesar’s handling of the elections and magistracies grew increasingly irregular. In 49,
he “arranged with the commons” that he would name one-half of the magistrates.203 In
48, he named a succession of consuls and replacement consuls (suffecti); only tribunes
and aediles were elected.204 In 47, he did not bother to arrange elections until his return
from the wars; the magistrates thus chosen served only three months.205 In 46, the only
timely election was for Caesar himself; the rest of the magistracies for 45 again were
delayed until his return late the following year.206 According to one analysis, 46 was the
last year that Caesar did not breach the lex annalis in his choice of magistrates and that
thereafter the pace of his violations increased.207 On the last day of 45, one of the consuls
died suddenly, and Caesar on the spot converted a tribal assembly to the comitia
centuriata for an ad hoc substitution, thus electing a one-day consul.208 Cicero joked
bitterly in a letter that the consul was so diligent that he never slept during his tenure.209
Caesar named half the magistrates for 44 and arranged for a suffect consul, Dolabella,
although he was not qualified by age.210 According to Dio, at the time of Caesar’s death
he had already arranged the magistrates for 43 and 42 in advance.211
Caesar had troublesome dealings with the tribunes, whom he had been claimed to be
protecting when he crossed the Rubicon. Immediately he offended the people in 49 by
turning back the intercession of the tribune L. Metellus, who had protested when Caesar
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cracked into the treasury. He threatened Metellus with death and told him that “war has
no use for free speech.”212 In 44, in an event that no doubt contributed to the final
conspiracy against him, Caesar removed two tribunes whose offense had been to remove
the royal diadems placed on Caesar’s statutes. His action led to unrest and a nasty
reaction; his choice for suffect counsel was jeered in public (“He’s no consul!”) and
angry voters wrote in the names of the deposed tribunes on their electoral ballots.213 Soon
after this high-handed act by Caesar, the conspirators removed him by their own extraconstitutional means.
The second triumvirate of Antony, Lepidus and Octavian, a more formal arrangement
than the first, was created by a lex Titia in 43 as a new supreme power overlaid upon the
structure of the constitution. The triumvirs were impatient: The law granting their power
was passed without the observance of the trinundinum.214 Antony soon picked up where
his predecessors had left off, blocking the election of Dolabella via his dual roles of
presiding magistrate and augur.215 The triumvirs also re-stocked the senatorial class,
depleted by civil war, by rapidly moving their own supporters through the magistracies
with artificial haste. Dio tells us of several electoral abuses: The magistrates for 43 and
42 were chosen in advance, without approval of senate or assemblies. With five days left
in 43, the praetors were sent to their provinces and replacements named. With the
apparent consent of the triumvirs, one tribune had another removed by plebiscite. In 42,
city magistrates were named several years in advance; in 40 suffect consuls and praetors
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were inserted near the end of the year, and aediles on the last day; by 39 the triumvirate
had decided to name all the consuls for the next eight years.216 In 38, the triumvirs
promised magistracies to the supporters of Sextus Pompey as part of negotiations.217 Also
in the year 38, there were an astonishing 67 praetors, apparently including the accidental
appointment of a slave as quaestor.218 The magistracies had become an open joke.
Antony was widely mocked for making even a low-born general, once a muleteer, a
consul.219 It is not clear whether the regular practice was to confirm all these
appointments in the assemblies,220 but there are hints of at least the pretense of elections.
Plutarch tells us that Antony was arranging an election when he received the news of
Cicero’s death.221 In 36, Dio reports a shortage of candidates for aedile, implying an
election was held.222
Caesar and the second triumvirs had inherited a tattered Republic that was already
inured to delayed elections, prearranged results and meaningless auspices. Botsford, in
his survey of the history of Roman popular assemblies, tells the rest:

Although Caesar continued to submit his plans to the assemblies
for legalization, he rapidly concentrated in his own person powers
and functions hitherto exercised by the people; and the triumviri,
his successors, after a sham-republican interregnum, constituted in
law as well as in fact a three-headed despot.223
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R.E. Smith, writing of Caesar’s consulship in 59, interprets that year as the beginning of
an organic, decade-long process. “The whole decade,” he opines, “must be seen as one
vast complex event, whose end was the end of the Republic.” 224
Just as important a factor, perhaps, was the sheer passage of time. Eighteen years
elapsed from Caesar’s crossing of the river in 49 to the naval battle of Actium in 31,
where the forces of Octavian defeated Antony and Cleopatra and decided the future of the
Roman state. When Octavian came to power it had been nearly two decades since Rome
was governed by free elections, and three decades since it had been governed by stable
elections. This long lapse would be a key to Octavian’s success in recreating a
government that many Romans had never known, or no longer remembered. “How few
were left,” Tacitus laments of the age of Augustus, “who had seen the Republic!” 225
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Part Three: The False Restoration

The Idealized Republic

Between his acquisition of sole power in 31 B.C. and his death in 14 A.D., Octavian
(renamed Augustus in 27 B.C.) transformed the Roman state from an elective Republic to
a Principate under the domination of a single man. The Romans called Augustus the
princeps, a reassuring throwback to the Republican princeps senatus, a term connoting
dignity and moral authority rather than monarchial power. We know him instead as the
first emperor. Whereas Julius Caesar had failed to hold power because of his offensive
trampling of Republican constitutional forms, Augustus succeeded brilliantly by
“restoring” those forms. Under Augustus the elections and the electoral assemblies were
sanctified by marble and draped with fresh glory. Augustus himself proudly led his clan
to the Campus Martius each year to emphasize the ancient ritual
After the upheavals the Romans needed to believe in their Republic, and so the
restoration was built entirely upon an idealized version of it. In the Augustan literature,
Rome was destined by the gods to rule the world because Rome was just and virtuous.
Her solemn duty was, as Virgil put it, “to spare the vanquished and subdue the proud in
war.”1 This virtue and hence the justification for Rome's success was derived specifically

Aen. 6.853: parcere subiectis et debellare superbos. Augustus strikes the same note in RG 3.2, saying he
preferred to spare enemies rather than destroy them: conservare quam excidere malui.
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from its form of government – the Republican constitution. Rome's overthrow of its kings
early in its own history, and the establishment of a constitutional self-rule, stood at the
core of the national self-concept. A century before Augustus, Polybius had written:

There surely can be nobody so petty or so apathetic in his
outlook that he has no desire to discover by what means
and under which system of government the Romans
succeeded in less than 53 years in bringing under their rule
almost the whole of the civilized world, an achievement
which is without parallel in human history.2

Later, in his dissertation on the Republican government, Polybius asserted “that the
principal factor which makes for success or failure is the form of a state's constitution; it
is from this source, as if from a fountainhead, that all designs and plans of action not only
originate but reach their fulfillment.”3 In other words, Polybius credited Rome's success
specifically to its form of government. The Romans took Polybius and their idealized
Republic to heart, just as Americans two millennia later would approvingly weave the
more flattering parts of Alexis de Tocqueville into their own self-concept.
Livy picked up the theme of Republican virtue in his monumental history of Rome.
“My task from now on,” Livy writes after he finishes off the last king, “will be to trace
the history in peace of a free nation, governed by annually elected officers of state and
subject not to the caprice of individual men, but to the overriding authority of law.”4 At
the end of Book V, in Camillus' stirring speech urging his countrymen not to abandon
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Rome, Livy makes him ask them whether they would so easily forsake the hallowed
meeting-grounds of the Republican assemblies:

Remember, too, our public functions nearly all of which we
transact, after due ceremony, within the pomerium, and to
what oblivion and neglect we are condemning them. The
Meeting of the Curies, to deal with questions of war, the
Meeting of the Centuries for the election of consuls or
military tribunes – where with the proper rites can these be
held but in the places tradition has made sacred?5

Later, in an excursus on Alexander the Great (9.17), Livy contemptuously compares
Alexander's brief successes to the full weight of centuries of duly elected Roman
magistrates. In short, Livy idealized Rome by idealizing the Republican constitution.
Julius Caesar's usurpation from 49-44 B.C. therefore provided an instructive lesson
for Augustus on the dangers of omitting a Republican pretext. It is curious, in light of the
pains Caesar took to appear legitimate prior to 49, how little concern he evinced for
Republican form once he regained Rome.6 His disregard for constitutional government
reached its climax in February 44 when he attained the perpetual dictatorship and threw
two tribunes out of office for removing the diadems from his statues. In so doing, he
sealed his own fate. His heir did better.

5

Livy 5.52.
Precisely because the early imperial coinage reflects a vigorous Republican pretext, it is interesting that
Caesarian coinage does not. It usually refers to Caesar's personal station and glory, or the association of his
gens with Venus Victrix. For example c. 44 B.C. we find CAESAR PATER PATRIAE (BMC.4187;
Syd.1069), CLEMENTIAE CAESARIS (BMC.4176-7; Syd.1076) and even what must have been the
hastily produced CAESAR DICT PERPETUO (BMC.4169, Syd.1073).
6
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The Electoral Pretext under Augustus

1. Magistracies and Candidates

In his own possession of Republican magistracies, and in his relations with those who
held them, Augustus carefully maintained the appearance of proper respect for the
constitution and tradition. In return an eager parade of candidates came forward to
participate in the maintenance of the Republican pretext, seeking both the old offices and
new ones created for them by the princeps. Dio tells us that beyond the title of triumvir
Octavian demanded no “offensive” (that is, non-Republican) titles for himself.7 But he
did assume offices and powers with safe Republican precedents. Octavian was made
sacrosanctus akin to a tribune in 36 B.C. and thereafter was allowed to sit on the front
bench.8 Returning from the field that year, Octavian obediently remained outside the
pomerium to address an assembly.9 He was elected to a second consulship for 33 B.C.,
which he both assumed and resigned on the Kalends of January.10 Except for the
unprecedented institution of the triumvirate itself, Octavian observed legalities with
respect to the Republican magistracies.
In 31 B.C., after the end of prearranged consuls under the triumvirate, Octavian
entered into his third consulship.11 This began an unbroken succession of consulships that
7

Dio 47.15.
Dio 49.14. Other ancient sources differ. Appian (B. Civ. 5.132) says Octavian was named tribune for life
in 36 B.C. Orosius (6.18.34) refers to this event as a grant of tribunicia potestas, which Dio dates later.
Dio's specific description of sacrosanctus for 36 B.C. seems to give him more credibility on the question.
9
Dio 49.15.
10
App. 3.28.
11
Dio 50.10.
8
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lasted until 23 B.C. Such a repeated succession had only Marius for a precedent, but there
is no evidence the assemblies were anything but willing; A.H.M. Jones reckons the
people were “spontaneously eager” to keep him.12 In 30, according to Dio, Octavian was
awarded a tribune's power to protect citizens via the ius auxilii.13 That year Octavian
named the son of Cicero as his co-consul, a nice stroke of Republican nostalgia and a
final dig at Antony.14 In his triple triumph of 29 B.C., in an unusual show of deference,
his co-consul followed behind him and even offered the sacrifice.15
In 28-27 Augustus rearranged the state and his powers. According to Dio, Augustus
agreed to “conform to ancient customs,” to lay down his office properly at the end of his
term, to invalidate the illegal acts of the triumvirate, and to share the fasces with his coconsul.16 This settlement was the basis for Augustus' claim that he had transferred control
of the state back to the senate and people of Rome.17 Augustus claimed that from this
point he exceeded all men in auctoritas but held no more legal powers than his co-

A.H.M. Jones, “The Elections under Augustus,” JRS Vol. 45, Parts 1 and 2 (1955), 13. This eagerness is
further evidenced after 23 B.C. by the people's repeated offers of consulships and the dictatorship to
Augustus.
13
Dio 51.19. He also states that from this point Octavian held tribunician power for life, but is probably
mistaken; it seems more consistent that Octavian was only sacrosanctus from 36 B.C., but received the ius
auxilii from 30 B.C., and then the full potestas from 23 B.C. onward. See P.A. Brunt and J.M. Moore, eds.
Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the Divine Augustus (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1967), 11. The matter of ius auxilii is especially significant for Jones, who traces from this point the
eventual transfer of the power to hear appeals to the emperor. A.H.M. Jones, Studies in Roman Government
and Law (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1960), 54.
14
Plut. Cic. 49.
15
Dio 51.21.
16
Dio 53.1. This seems to be a retroactive admission of irregularity, but the sources emphasize the gratitude
for his “restoration” of the Republic rather than any dissatisfaction with the previous arrangement.
17
Aug. RG 34: rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli.
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magistrates.18 Technically, this was true, but no man had held such a collection of powers
at the same time.
In 23 B.C., Augustus rearranged matters again and announced he would resign his
consulship. In return the senate granted him tribunicia potestas with the power to submit
laws to the people and convene the senate and he retained his imperium.19 Augustus
relied upon this tribunician power, a Republican symbol, as his primary source of
legitimacy for the rest of his reign.20 Jones comments:
By posing as a tribune of the plebs Augustus hoped to rally
this popular sentiment for himself, and to represent that he
occupied his high position ad tuendam plebem. .... To the
plebs, it was a guarantee... that Augustus was not
abandoning them to the optimates, to the optimates a threat
that Augustus might revive the popular tradition of his
adoptive father if they would not play ball with him.21

Augustus cites his tribunicia potestas repeatedly in the Res Gestae.22 He dated his reign
by it, setting the precedent for all future emperors. Dio considers these settlements to be
the true birth of the monarchy.23 One modern author notes acerbically of the famous
claim of the Res Gestae: “Augustus may have handed over the state, but he fails to
mention that the senate handed it back.”24

Aug. RG 34: Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praetiti, potestatis autem nihlio amplius habui quam
ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.
19
Dio 53.32.
20
Syme calls Augustus' imperium proconsulare and the tribunicia potestas "the two pillars of his rule"
Roman Revolution, 337.
21
Jones, Imperium, 116.
22
Aug. RG 4.2, 4.4, 22, 35.2.
23
Dio 53.17.
24
W. Turpin, “Res Gestae 34.1 and the Settlement of 27 B.C.,” CQ N.S., Vol. 44, No. 2 (1994), 427.
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After 23 B.C., Augustus’ principal Republican powers therefore were his imperium
and his tribunicia potestas.25 He held only two ceremonial consulships after his
resignation in 23 B.C., but any inconvenience from not holding the actual title was
removed in 19 B.C. when he was awarded the permanent right to sit with the consuls
anyway.26 Jones sees this as another significant step in the evolution of the princeps'
jurisdiction, as from this point Augustus heard appeals from the praetors by virtue of his
consular authority.27 As a final note concerning his own magistracies, Augustus showed
notable caution in his treatment of two Republican titles that veered too close to the
reality of his power. He notes briefly that he was twice offered but declined the post of
dictator.28 Also interesting is his pussyfooting around the title of censor, which he
appears to have avoided despite wielding censorial powers. Dio states flatly that
Augustus "became censor" in 29 B.C. but Augustus says no such thing, noting merely
that he had served as curator legum et morum.29 Jones judged that Augustus relied either
on special grants of potestas or his overall imperium to carry out censorial duties.30 An
inscription in the fasti Venusini seems to support this idea: after listing Augustus and
Agrippa as co-consuls for 28 B.C., the next line adds, “these same men conducted a
lustrum with censorial power.”31 In 19 B.C. Augustus was named praefectus moribus for

Another much-plowed field is the precise nature of Augustus' imperium, when it was consular and when
it was proconsular, and the extent to which it was maius over other magistrates. See especially A.H.M.
Jones, “The Imperium of Augustus,” JRS Vol. 41, Parts 1 and 2 (1951): 112-119.
26
Dio 54.10.
27
Jones, Studies, 78.
28
Aug. RG 5.1.
29
Dio 52.42; Aug. RG 6.1.
30
Jones, Studies, 354-357.
31
Idem censoria potest. lustrum fecer. V. Ehrenberg and A.H.M. Jones. Documents Illustrating the Reigns
of Augustus and Tiberius, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 35.
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a five-year term and then again in 12 B.C.32 At any rate he conducted three lectiones of
the senate during his reign and three censuses.33
Augustus' treatment of other office-holders generally conformed to Republican
practice. Appian notes that under the triumvirate, Octavian allowed the magistrates to
function normally.34 A functioning tribunate (or at least, one functioning in Octavian's
favor) is suggested by a tribune's successful veto to block the plot of Antony's faction in
32 B.C.35 In general, Augustus seemed to realize that it was more valuable to honor the
nobles with magistracies than to hog all the symbols of power himself. As early as 41
B.C. the triumvirs were appointing both ordinarii and “lesser consuls” to spread the
wealth, a practice resumed later in Augustus’ reign.36 Later his creation of the vigintiviri
in the city created even more opportunities for patronage. Suetonius says Augustus
created new offices, increased the number of praetors, and even requested two consular
colleagues during his own tenure, which the senate refused to do on the grounds that even
a single colleague was "sufficient detraction from his supreme dignity."37 Although there
were occasionally shortages of candidates for aedile or tribune, there is no evidence of a
shortage of willing candidates for praetor and consul.38 The nobles were generally eager
to take part in the regime. M. Hammond contended that the magistracies under Augustus
were used as “a sop for the aristocracy to console them for their loss of military power

32

Dio 54.10, 54.30.
See Jones, Studies, 350-351 for analysis.
34
App. B Civ. 5.132.
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Dio 50.2.
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Dio 48.35.
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Suet. Aug. 37.
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Jones, “Elections,” 11.
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and to symbolize the continuance of the Republic.”39 The link of legitimacy between the
magistracies and the princeps is reinforced by the fasti of the magistri vici, which begins
with 43 B.C., the year of Octavian's first consulship.40
Scholars have spent considerable effort trying to discern from the fasti whether
Augustus had a particular strategy in the advancement of magistrates. Seager analyzed
the lists and found that most of the ordinarii consuls were nobles, while more of the
replacement suffecti were new men.41 Brunt argued that the rise of novi among the
suffecti was both a practical result of the need for new talent, and the coming-of-age (later
in Augustus' reign) of a postwar generation.42 In any event they owed Augustus for his
patronage. The pretext was important: the maintenance of Republican form allowed them
more dignity and status than they would have received as openly hand-picked toadies of
Augustus. “Thus,” Shotter observes, “magistrates and promagistrates were dependent
upon him, but not in an overt or humiliating fashion.”43

2. Assemblies and Elections

The Republican citizen voting assemblies continued to meet under the Principate and
frequently are mentioned in the sources in the role of ratifying arrangements made by

M. Hammond, The Augustan Principate in Theory and Practice During the Julio-Claudian Period (New
York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 87.
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Augustus and/or the senate.44 There could hardly have been a more direct source of
Republican legitimacy than the approval of the same ancient bodies that for centuries had
elected magistrates and spoken for the populus Romanus. The assemblies assisted
Octavian/Augustus at each critical step. At the onset of his public career, Octavian
formalized his link to the past by accepting his adoption as Caesar's son “in the
customary way,” presumably in an assembly.45 Dio also says his first, senate-coerced
election as consul was confirmed by “the people.”46 No sooner had Octavian extracted
legitimacy from the senate and the assembly than he did a volte face and struck a deal
with Antony at Bononia. The result was the lex Titia from the tribunes establishing
Octavian, Antony and Lepidus in a five-year dictatorship as triumviri rei publicae
constituendae, cloaked by the assembly with “the name of law.”47 So was his designation
as sacrosanctus (or the grant of further powers, as conflicting sources say) in 36 B.C.48
His settlement of 28-27 B.C. and a division of command over the provinces was ratified
“by the senate and the people as well.”49 Dio further states that both “the people and
plebs” continued to hold elections after the rearrangement.50 In 7 B.C. the people and
senate insisted that Augustus’ adopted son Gaius be designated for the consulship despite
his insufficient age.51 According to Suetonius, the popular assemblies tried to name

44

The ancient authors, less legalistic than the historian-successors of Mommsen, often used “the people” as
a generic reference to the assemblies, leaving us to figure out which according to function. Occasionally a
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Augustus as pater patriae even before the senate took that action, and Tiberius was
adopted as Augustus' heir by a “special bill in the Forum.”52 In addition to specific
references in the sources, Brunt argues reasonably that many deeds attributed by
Suetonius and Dio to Augustus unilaterally most likely were ratified in some fashion by
the senate and/or the assemblies.53 Augustus took the assemblies seriously and prepared
his remarks to them just as carefully as he did his speeches in the senate.54
If the assemblies were grantors of legitimacy to the princeps, he paid them back in the
same coin. Nowhere did Augustus maintain the Republican pretext more assiduously than
in the arena of elections. The triumvirate had continued Caesar's high-handed
indifference to proper form in elections; Octavian seemed dedicated to restoring their
luster. It was no coincidence that his early building projects in Rome included the
refurbishing of the Rostra that his adopted father had put at the head of the Forum, adding
a new Rostra of his own facing it across the Forum at the temple of the Divine Julius, and
the restoration of a voting-place at the temple of Castor and Pollux.55 Agrippa took over
the rebuilding of the Saepta, or voting-pen, on the Campus Martius (Dio 53.23 says it was
for the comitia tributa, though the centuriate assembly met there also) as well as adding
the cavernous Diribitorium next door for the purpose of vote-counting. Augustus
personally took part in elections, humbly appearing to vote with his own tribe to show he

Suet. Aug. 58, 65.
Brunt, “The Role of the Senate in the Augustan Regime,” CQ N.S., Vol. 34, No. 2 (1984), 427.
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was a man of the people.56 These deeds were the basis of Tiberius' claim, in his funeral
oration in 14 A.D., that Augustus had "preserved the dignity of elections."57
But dignity and independence are different currencies. The truth seems to be that the
“restored Republic” was increasingly deferential to Augustus' choices for magistrates, a
deference that later in the Principate would harden into powerless acquiescence. From the
time of the first constitutional rearrangement in 27 B.C. Dio tells us Augustus was
naming at least some of the magistrates, while leaving other offices to the free choice of
the assemblies.58As it so happens, their “free” choice appeared to be in favor of Augustus
himself, as they kept returning him to the consulship until 23. Following his second
constitutional settlement in 23, in which he resigned the consulship, the populace
demanded that the senate offer Augustus the dictatorship; the princeps bared his breast
and begged to be allowed to refuse.59 Similarly in 19 B.C. the assembly kept a consulship
open for Augustus and sent a delegation to him begging that he accept it; Augustus
named one of the envoys consul instead.60 Whether Augustus (who earlier had nearly
died from illness) truly wanted to step back, or wanted popular acclaim, the result was the
same either way: By surrendering his formal power, Augustus had the assemblies
begging for him to pick it back up.
Later in his reign, his control over elections became more formalized with the
adoption of the lex Valeria Cornelia of 5 A.D., in which 10 centuries of the comitia
centuriata were renamed in honor of Gaius and Lucius Caesar and given the task of preSuet. Aug. 56.
Dio 56.40.
58
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59
Dio 54.1; Suet. Aug. 52.
60
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selecting preferred candidates.61 In 7 A.D., according to Dio, Augustus simply appointed
all the magistrates for the year; afterwards, because of failing health he stopped attending
the assemblies and forwarded an annual written list of his recommended candidates.62 In
14 A.D., the year of Augustus' death, Tacitus tells us flatly that the elections were
transferred from the assemblies to the senate outright.63 Tacitus says after this some of
Tiberius' nominations of candidates were automatic, while others were merely
recommendations – a distinction which seems to have made little difference.64
In sum, the voting assemblies conferred legitimacy upon Augustus at each critical
step of his career, during his struggle for preeminence in the triumvirate, in the postActium transition, in the settlements of 27 and 23 B.C., and as his reign neared its end
and the succession loomed. Hammond argues that Augustus truly had hoped for more
Republicanism out of the assemblies, but the watered-down stock of citizenry was not up
Ehrenberg and Jones, Documents, p. 76. Our knowledge of the lex Valeria Cornelia comes from a
subsequent inscription called the Tabula Hebana, dated to 19 A.D., when the voting procedure was further
modified to add additional early-voting centuries. Demougin (“Quo descendant,” 309) says this imparted a
sense of “quasi-divine” preference for the candidates so anointed.
62
Dio 55.34.
63
Tac. Ann. 1.15.1: tum primum e campo comitia ad patres translata sunt. Most scholars agree that “ad
patres” must mean the senate, as opposed to some other unidentified group of “fathers,” but some speculate
that while the senate may have chosen the “real” winners, the comitia still went through the motions of
electing them. This makes sense, considering that the Tabula Hebana five years later makes reference to
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F.B. Marsh, The Reign of Tiberius (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1931), 62. For a “topographic” hypothesis
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64
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to the task: he concluded the “city mob” was “no longer the Roman People.'” It had been
corrupted by manumission and foreign stock and had “a limited comprehension of the
problems of empire.”65 Just as the weak-kneed senate had forced Augustus to take more
power, according to Hammond, the people forced him in the direction of autocracy as
well. Taylor concludes a chapter of her book on Roman voting assemblies by picturing
them meeting in the fine marble structures constructed by Augustus. “There,'” she wrote,
“the henchmen designated by the emperors for office were acclaimed as consuls elected
by a sovereign people.”66

Willing Audiences for the Pretext

The transition from Republic to Principate under Augustus was not a top-down hoax
perpetuated by a clever few, but a willing, multi-lateral, cooperative process. Up and
down the levels of Roman society, participating groups cloaked the princeps with
Republican legitimacy, stretched Republican definitions or looked the other way. They
created a new consensus reality among themselves that employed comforting old names.
Tacitus struck a faint but appropriate note of suspicion in describing the early Principate:
“At home things were settled, official functions had their same labels.”67 We have seen
how Augustus co-opted the magistracies and candidates and the voting assemblies,
precisely by stressing their “Republicanism.” He did the same for other audiences as
Hammond, Augustan Principate, 131.
Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, 106.
67
Tac. Ann. 1.3.7: Domi res tranquillae, eadem magistratuum vocabula. I choose “labels” in the spirit of H.
Haynes' inferences about Tacitus' use of vocabula for words that had become separated from their
meanings. Haynes, “Tacitus's Dangerous Word,” Cl. Ant., Vol. 23, Number 1 (2004), 34.
65
66

87

well, and they confirmed his status: the senate, the equites, the plebs, religious audiences,
the military, the rest of Italy and the provinces, and even foreign states.
Furthermore, these audiences eagerly cooperated in the acceptance of Augustus’
successor Tiberius.68 Tacitus tells us that Tiberius wanted to be seen as “called and
elected by the state” instead of “having crept into power through the intrigues of a wife
and a dotard's adoption.” Several of the key audiences we have discussed rushed forward
to legitimize the succession: consuls, prefects, senate, army and assemblies all took a
loyalty oath.69 Yet even this was not enough; in the senate Tiberius compelled Messala
Valerus to swear that the proposed oath was spontaneous and freely given.70 Tiberius still
protested the award of power, calling the monarchy “a monstrous beast.” The senators
threw themselves at his feet and begged him to accept as he recoiled.71
Early in his rein Tiberius repaid these grants of authority by displaying deference for
Republican traditions. Suetonius gives several examples: He demonstrated a hatred of
flattery, praised free speech, and referred to the senate as "generous, just and indulgent
masters." He consulted frequently with the senate and allowed open dissension, once
even being the only vote on his side of a division. He deferred to the consuls as they
passed on the street. He rejected additional honors and the titles of imperator and pater
68
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Agrippa (Dio 54.12, 54.28), and Gaius and Lucius (RG 14). Eventually Augustus had to turn to Tiberius,
who was adopted in 4 A.D. "by a special bill in the Forum" (Suet. Aug. 65). Tiberius also held the
tribunician power (Dio 55.9, 55.13) and consulships (Dio 55.6, Suet. Aug. 97) and was primed for the
succession. At first blush the notion of “constitutional” or “Republican” power that could be transferred
across generations might seem an oxymoron, yet even in our own nation's history we have chosen as our
president a grandson (Adams), cousin (Roosevelt) and son (Bush) of previous presidents.
69
Tac. Ann. 1.7: ut vocatus electusque potius a re publica videretur quam per uxorium ambitum et senili
adoptione inrepsisse.
70
Tac. Ann. 1.8.
71
Suet. Tib. 24; Tac. Ann. 1.11.

88

patriae.72 Meanwhile, the magistracies continued to function. Tacitus mentions a tribune
casting a veto during a controversy over the scourging of actors.73 The elections
continued in form, judging from the Tabula Hebana, despite Tacitus' assertion that the
real business of choosing magistrates was transferred to the senate. Tacitus describes
Tiberius' practices of submitting candidates for election. Sometimes he coyly described a
man's career without mentioning his name, though it might be obvious. Other times he
instructed candidates not to canvass for themselves. Officially, however, Tiberius said
others were welcome to come forward. Tacitus concluded: “The greater the disguise of
freedom which marked it, the more cruel the enslavement into which it was soon to
plunge us.”74 Despite Tiberius' subsequent alleged depredations, by the time of his death
the legitimacy-granting audiences had grown well accustomed to their role. Upon the
succession of Gaius, “the senate immediately and unanimously conferred absolute power
upon him.”75

Conclusions: Augustus

The abuses of elections in the late Roman Republic provided Augustus and his
followers with the opportunity to be credited with restoring them to their original form. It
is too much to claim every audience under Augustus made a conscious, deliberate
decision to participate in a false restoration of Republican elections – the more interesting
Suet. Tib. For flattery, 27; free speech, 28; senate as “masters,” 29; frequent consultation with senate, 30;
lone dissenting vote, 31; deference to consuls, 31; rejection of honors, 26 (also in Tac. Ann. 1.72).
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interpretation, indeed, is that for the most part they believed it. Even in the occasional
flare-ups of resistance to Augustus we find no evidence for a widespread belief the
Republic had been usurped.76 The audiences accomplished their feat by the use of terms
with shifting meanings. Res publica and libertas meant dramatically different things to
Cicero than they did to Velleius, who asserted that under Augustus the Republic had been
restored to its pristine form.77 Hammond, commenting on the changing meaning of
libertas, notes that even Neronian coinage included the phrase P.R. restituta, and that of
Vespasian, S.P.Q.R. adsertori libertatis public[ae]. The term res publica became a
general synonym for the Roman state, not for any specific constitutional scheme.78
Libertas, too, became a generic rallying cry from which all parties sought to draw “moral
capital.”79 Tacitus hence employed his subtle term vocabula to describe the nouns
“liberty” and “freedom” as used in the Principate.80 Even Pliny, at the end of the first
century A.D. was able to give thanks with a straight face “that the Republic still exists.”81
Brunt and Moore state:

The constitutional arrangements made by Augustus are
important as partial explanation of his success in winning
the consent of the upper classes. They gave him the
necessary legal powers to perform his executive tasks, and
legality in itself was important to the Roman mind. They
enabled him to guide policy in general within a framework
76
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which preserved the Republican forms. The Republican
constitution was hallowed by antiquity; and it was as a
Republic that Rome had grown great.82

Octavian emerged from the Republican rubble to shape a new regime from 31 B.C.
onward. He did not rule by the hated title of rex but merely as princeps, first citizen. For
the rest of his life the renamed Augustus governed in two ways: through his unofficial
personal standing (auctoritas) and by employing a salad-bowl of official titles and
powers (potestas) carried over from the Republican constitution. History knows him as
the first emperor. Yet by maintaining Republican labels, holding elections and consulting
the senate, Augustus asserted until his death in 14 A.D that he had "restored the
Republic," and he was widely credited by his contemporaries with doing exactly that. The
most striking aspect of this process was that it was ratified at every level of Roman
society and even by some external actors – senate and aristocracy, magistrates and
candidates, assemblies, army, urban plebs, intellectuals, Italians and provincials, allied
states and foreign kings. If we could build a time machine, visit the Forum and inquire of
a citizen of Augustan Rome (perhaps on his way to a sham election) whether he regretted
surrendering a half-millennium of libertas to this new form of tyranny, he would be
astonished at such a nonsensical question.
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Conclusions: The Role of Electoral Abuse

As the Republic careened toward collapse in the 60s and 50s B.C. its constitutional
mechanisms proved incapable of dealing with unrestrained assertions of group interests,
political rivalry, violence and urban frustration. Some scholars blame the senate for its
failure to comprehend what was happening and the retreat of the optimates into a
reactionary shell. Some blame urban pressures and the utter lack of any constitutional
mechanism for dealing with the unprecedented degree of urban violence. Some blame
pressure from the Italians and the provinces; others, the dissatisfactions of the military.
The system of government that was developed under a small city-state founded upon
seven hills could not be stretched to govern an empire.83
As a result the Romans bent and ultimately broke their Republican constitution. The
focal point for all their problems and frustrations was the mechanism for control of the
government – the annual elections. Each group, faction and party set about to manipulate
the elections for its own interests. Each sought to delay the elections, to bend the laws
concerning office, to abuse religious obstruction, to cow the assemblies by violence or to
buy them with money, to control them by cabal, to usurp the powers of the elected
magistrates, and on occasion simply to stuff the ballot-box or to rig the procedure. Any
original justification for the existence of such measures, even ostensibly “legal” ones,
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was swept away in the zeal of their application. Each practitioner of abuse, considering
himself to be acting for the “good,” justified his abuse by the offenses of another.
This was the lawless state inherited by Caesar and the second triumvirs, who were
thus able to treat the elections and the magistracies as the shams they had become. And
when the despots had finished laying the state to waste for another 18 years beyond that,
Augustus, mindful of the provinces’ weariness from being bled, of the desperate urban
population, of the bankrupted equites and the exhausted upper classes, of their craving for
order above all else, gave them what they wanted. Crawford concludes:

It was becoming possible to represent a monarchy as compatible
with the Roman system of values and to the fact that almost all
men were becoming increasingly receptive to such arguments.84
In the 1954 play A Man for all Seasons by Thomas Bolt, the character of Sir Thomas
More, who eventually loses his life to principle, argues over the importance of the rule of
law with a character named Roper:

ROPER: So now you’d give the devil the benefit of the law?
MORE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the devil?
ROPER: I’d cut down every tree in England to do that.
MORE: Oh, and when the last law was down and the devil turned
on you where would you hide, Roper, all the laws being flat? This
country is planed thick with laws from coast to coast, man’s laws
not God’s, and if you cut them down – and you’re just the man to
do it – do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
blow then? Yes, I’d give the devil the benefit of the law, for my
own safety’s sake.
84
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Human nature is to sacrifice principle to exigency. This is precisely what happened with
elections in the late Republic, as that state imploded amidst class strife, urban violence,
and power struggles among a new breed of proconsular warlords. The fault of the final
generation of the Roman Republic was to trample its rules for desired ends, rules which
were to be enforced against opponents, but to be dispensed with for supporters. The
lesson is general for all times and all nations: We establish the rule of law to guard
against the rule of despots; the challenge lies in not forgetting why we did it.
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